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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Industrial conflict is as apparent today as it has ever been, 
although not as real. The present means of communication brings about 
an awareness of the situation whil e statistical data illustrates that the 
problem is not as alarming as it appears to be. The history of this con-
flict in the United States ~~ends over a relatively short time but is 
concentrated heavily within this era. At times this struggle has been 
bloody and costly, but today it has developed into a more conservative 
vein due to the fact that the original shock of union intervention is 
now history although there may be virgin areas yet to be entered. It is 
not a question of under-remunerating or underestimating the problem but 
rather a question of recognizing the situation as it now exists. 
Management is at the crossroads, that is, at least accepting 
unions as a fact but not wanting complete integration. Whether or not 
management will proceed backward or forlvard from this position is 
questionable as the middle road is usually the safest. It is from this 
position that the paper will be developed. 
Using the following divisions , this background material of 
~ esent economic conditions, the bargaining powers of these two insti-
tutions and the economic law of settlement which are necessary to achieve 
the ends of management and labor (II), developing from here the basic 
conflicts (III), is used in forming conclusions (IV). 
quote: 
The general theme of this work is contained in the following 
~Vhat a chance we in management missedl From 1921 - 1930 we 
had everything our own way. A friendly administration in 
Washington. Low taxes. And a friendly public. And what did 
we do vd th our power? On our moral side we produced men like 
Insul and Hopson and Musica, who undermined the confidence of 
business. 
So what did we get? Beginning in 1933 we got the biggest 
beating that any group of Americans ever took. Congress socked 
us with good laws. · It socked us with bad laws. It socked those 
of us who were decent. Who cared? The public wanted us socked 
and socked we were. 
Gentlemen of labor I must accuse you of not being original. How 
fully you have immitated us of management. From 1933 - 1942 you 
rode high. You were tops. A friendly administration in 
Washington. All sorts of favors handed you from the Washington 
political table. So what did you do with your poWer. On the 
economic side you produced men like ••• I Beck, Maloney and 
Hoffa I who gave labor a black lie. On the moral side you gave 
yourselves a labor boom, regardless of the consequences to any 
other element of the population. 
You forgot the very thing we forgot. It's just three jumps 
from the master bedroom to the dog house . 
Now that dog house is yearning for you. The federal government 
and many state governments are beginning to sock you with laws. 
Some of these laws may have too many teeth. Some of these may 
bite big hnnks out of good unions as well as bad unions. If 
the public wants you socked, why, socked you will be. 
And don 1 t think you can duck any of it by yelling anti-labor 
and "reactionaryn and "communist". You can 1t stop hell with a 
vocabulary. When the devil is after you, the only escape is 
repentance and good works . 
So how about a few good works?* 
*1, pp 6.5-66 
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CHAPTER II 
BARGAINING CCNDITiiliS, PROCEDURES AND POLICIES 
Today one hears many executives mutter about the "profit squeeze" 
and "profitless prosperity'. These terms refer to the squeeze between 
severe cost rises and the relatively moderate price rises which result in 
lower profits. In order to state such a problem one must disseminate 
innumerous statistical data, concluding whether or not the squeeze is more 
apparent than real. 
The National Association of Manufacturers states the problem in 
the following way: 
The post World War II period of history of manufacturing has 
been one of rising costs per unit of output - particularly 
labor costs and taxes. ' Compensation of employees rose 23% per 
unit of output between 19h8 - 1956. Corporate taxes rose 32% 
on the same basis. · 
These cost increases have been reflected partially - but only 
partially- in higher prices of manufactured goods, which rose 
only 10% in the same period. The result has been a drastic 
reduction in profit per unit of output.* 
A recent study in Fortune showed that durin.g the five year 
interval between 1950 - 1951 and 1955 - 1956 the hundred largest cor-
poratians (industrial) of the United States experienced declines of 16.3% 
in earnings prior to taxes per dollar of sales, lh.9% in earnings per 
dollar of net worth and 17% in earnings per dollar of net operating invest-
ment, which included all assets administered by management. Through most 
of the five-year period, the downward pressure on profits was .accompanied, 
and to some extent concealed, by increases in sales and invested capital 
with the result that profits continued to rise, even though ratios were 
declining. In 1956 profits were four percent lower than in 1955.** 
Most significant of all, perhaps, is the fact that capital 
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invested smce 1950 - 1951 has earned an annual return of only 10.6% as com-
pared with the annual return of 17% of total investment in the preceding five 
years. 
According to Time, the figures stated by bus:iness that is, 11 sales 
increased more than 100% in ten years, net profits declined from 5.2% of 
sales in 1947 and only 3.5% in 195611 are entirely misleading because they 
fail to illustrate that industry spends so much on replacement and expansion 
programs that the profit squeeze becomes more apparent than real. 
Gross profit margins have actually gone up and will total 7.65% 
on sales versus 7.4% in 1946- 1948. The fact that so much of 
this profit is poured back into expansion makes the profit 
squeeze more apparent than real.* 
Business has reinvested more than 264 billion dollars since the 
end of World War II and this can be clearly seen by an investigation of the 
book value of stocks which have increased sharply since that time. Although 
the statement stands one must also consider the fact that such innovation is 
essential and should not be considered as part of profits. UsuaJlY .:.,1creased 
book value of a stock is due to inflation rather than an increase in real 
value. However, if the rise in value is not due to inflation then this should 
be considered a fair return. 
The impact of rising taxes was added to the top of this squeeze . 
The 85% increase in the amount of taxes levied was far greater - percentage-
wise- than the increase on profits on which they were imposed. It was 
greater in proportion than the increase in dollar sales of manufacturing 
corporations and it even exceeded the increase in compensation paid to 
employees .~'* 
*4, p 98 
**5, p 3 
Due to the 14 percentage points increase in the corporate tax 
rates since 1948 there has been a drop of 23% in the amount 
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left £rom the dollar of corporate earnings after the government 
takes its share - £rom 62 cents to 48 cents.* 
In relation to the increased cost of wages, the American worker 
has become the best paid worker in the world. In this statement lies a £act 
but at the same time it conceals the need for future improvement. Compared 
to 1940, and certainly since 1930, great progress has been made through 
unionism. The employee has more security on the job, pension and health 
benefits, reduced unemployment and higher incomes. He has more material 
benefits which include paid vacations, from six to eleven paid holidays and 
his working hours have been reduced, to say nothing about working conditions. 
At 65 he will receive an income from social security and also from union 
negotiated corporation pension funds. 
There has also been great progress in all other areas but the other 
side of the picture should not be ignored. Since World War II workers' status, 
aside from fringe benefits, has not improved as greatly as it might appear; 
the cut in overtime pay and the increases in prices often have not been of£-
set by higher wage rates. 
The employees' work continues to be arduous, taxing and repetitive. 
Dostoyevsky has written that to destroy a man one need only ruin the character 
o£ usefulness of his work. It must be mentioned here that the increased 
division of labor has severely limited the creativity of the worker. Besides 
this the worker is better o££ materially but the interest of his work has 
lessened. Great progress has been made economically, socially and politi-
cally but there are gaps in the future. 
Union Power: 
The need for these improvements caused individuals to organize and 
to develop ways of bringing improvements into reality. The strategy used took 
~,p3 
diverse, and sometimes perverse, forms . The union may attempt to tie up the 
entire industry; it may attempt to tie up one employer at a time so as to 
increase the speed with which the struck firm might lose its competitive 
position; it may attempt to damage the company by rotating the workers on 
strike, by increasing absenteeism, by refusing to work overtime and so on. 
The union may strike one firm at a time vdth the balance of the striking 
workers being supported by union workers. 
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Various forms of indirect pressures can be developed. The 11Union 
Label" is designed to encourage workers and the public to prefer union made 
goods and services . A device of some sort, either a button or label identifies 
this as a union product and to be issued by union persormel. It is used to 
attract loyalty from union members . It has encouraged employers to deal with 
unions . It has attracted support from non-union members and built internal 
morale within the union movement . 
A boycott is similar in purpose but more positive in action than 
the use of the union label. It is a more formidable attempt to mobilize the 
power of unions, as consumers, either to punish an employer for actions dis-
approved by the union or to bring pressure upon an employer to adopt a certain 
course of action desired by the union. The simplest expression of the boycott 
is the 'fVfe Don't Patronize" of "unfair list". Members are then discouraged 
or prohibited under penalty of fine from trading with the firms whose names 
are so listed. The list is legal and legitimate but its effectiveness is 
limited by the extent to which the firms listed depend upon the trade of union 
members . 
A secondary boycott exists when trade is stopped with one business 
establishment in order to force compliance upon another . For unionists to 
refuse to buy products made by a firm would be a simple primary boycott. If 
this does not produce sufficient results unions might then boycott any mer-
chant who sells these products and usually any other product sold, expecting 
him to bring pressure upon the manufacturer to settle his labor disputes. 
A variation of the boycott has attracted much attention, both 
legally and publicly, is the "hot cargo clause". This is a refusal of one 
union through the members to work upon materials originally produced by a 
rival union or by an unfair employer. The weapon inflicts great damage upon 
employers who are helpless to do anything concerning it, especiallywhen it 
results from a jurisdictional dispute between unions. 
Political action is important, either through direct vote or 
lobbying, as an effective collateral weapon although the importance of the 
direct vote has been over-rated as could be seen by the last national 
election. 
The sit-down strike, popularized by the late thirties, was used 
to dramatize the plight of the workers to the public and also to reduce the 
possibility of the employer to resume operations of the plant by securing 
strike breakers . This was used for a short duration in the recent Kohler 
strike. The turning point in the popularity of the sit-down strike came 
with a Supreme Court decision that employers could discharge the strikers 
because they had not used the proper procedure for settling disputes as 
explicitly mentioned in the Wagner Act.* 
Another type of strike which developed due to the aforementioned 
decision was the slow-down strike. In this type of strike the workers 
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remain on the job and work under the appearance that they are working at their 
*7, 
full pace but an examination of the tally sheet shows a drop in production. 
This could be a gradual drop or could come about spontaneously. 
There are several further ways of deception which cannot be 
classified. An example of one is the following. 
• • • striking workers decided to return to work in a shirt 
factory as 'scabs' under union orders. Company officials felt 
that they had broken the strike, but curious letters began 
pouring in +rom a number of cities. Somehow or other the 
shirts happened to be put together in a queer sort of way. 
Where one sleeve wasn't shorter the other was longer; the 
collar was invariably too tight or a neckband a size and a 
half its own junior. The matching colors were rather 
impressionistic. And the dealers were enraged at the 
carelessness with which some of their orders were fulfilled. 
The company seemed bent on sending things nobodywanted.* 
1~agement Power: 
Although it is difficult for large groups of employers, perhaps 
no more so than unions, to adapt a unified policy, certain segments of 
industry have been quite successful in this regard. The National 
Association of Manufacturers by 1903 had become chiefly concerned with 
labor relations, an interest it still retains, although not concerned with 
direct negotiations over union management matters. The N .A.M. has been a 
strong influence as lobbyists in the government and, as a result, has 
brought about legislation which has been beneficial to all management. 
A similar program carried on by the N.A. M., as well as the 
independent employer, is the use of those facts which are at their dis-
posal. This is probably the most popular legitimate weapon of management, 
as well as the strongest. His ability to use those facts in the most 
strategic fashion is his second weapon, an ability resting on his superior 
access to the public ear. The following are examples: 
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SURE AMERICA'S GOING AHEAD IF WE ALL PULL TOGETHER. American 
teamwork is management that pays reasonable wages and takes a 
fair profit.* 
If we were still producing at the 1850 rate per hour, we would 
need over 300 million workers, each producing, each working 43 
hours a week to produce as much as we did in 1944.~~ 
There are many other ways or means used by management but not 
constantly as they are used in e~ergency situations. Some of these are: 
private police, hired company guards, which can be used to intimidate union 
organizers through legal means; the labor spy is another means of deception 
used by management to find out the plans and actions of unions. He may be 
able to work his way into the hierarchy and at times even stir up violence. 
Perhaps the most effective weapons in earlier times were the 
11yellow-dog11 contract and the "black list1'. The yellow-dog contract has 
since been declared illegal. The black list has since lost its value as a 
modern weapon, although there may be instances where it still can be used. 
It is concerned with the listing of workers who are classified as trouble-
makers; that is, those who demand higher wages, better conditions and hours 
in open violation so as to promote internal disorder. It would seem to be 
a natural thing for such a person's name to be passed around through an 
industry so that trouble would be eliminated. It is a secret and effective 
way of eliminating 11 uncooperati ve individuals". 
The lockout is the counterpart of the strike. Statistics are 
lacking as to the amount of times this measure is used, as it is classified 
under "work stoppages" and many times such acts are blamed on unions. This 
procedure is used to prevent all or a group of workers from performing 
their work so as to force the union into submission. 
*9, p 1 
**10, p 1 
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This means is effective when the employer desires to destroy a 
small union. This action usually occurs in a slack season when inventories 
are high and little loss will result. Word is then passed around in the 
shop that it will remain closed until the 11labor agitators" are eliminated. 
This is an attempt to return to the open shop although such actions could 
be classified as unfair labor practices. 
In conclusion, it is management's perusal of pertinent information 
at the bargaining table and its issuance to the proper means of communication 
that is its most effective pcwrer. 
Law of Determination: 
The determination of the aforementioned economic powers of unions 
and management has been answered in several ways but all are simply based 
on the need for each others services in relation to the end each institution 
is attempting to achieve -wages and profits. 
Basically, the power of labor compared to that of management ., 
depends upon the importance of continuing cooperation of each 
party. Management offers labor an income, and labor offers 
management its labor services. Both are equally necessary to 
the continuous flow of production, but labor's need for 
employment and income may not balance management's need for 
labor . It is in this concept of a relative need that we find 
the basic determinant of power.* 
Realizing that formulas are not very precise when considering 
rational beings, they are helpful in many instances. The following is the 
most concise formula seen by the author in finding the net bargaining power 
of labor and/or management: 
Labor's (Labor's desire + Management's desire) 
Bargaining = (for labor for labor's services) 
Power 
*11, p 301 
**12, pp 129-130 
(Management's desire to +Labor's desire for) 
(reduce wage payments wage payments** ) 
Relations are not likely to be characterized by these extreme 
positions but rather by a subtle combination of these needs. 
Government Intervention: 
The failure of industry to alter its industrial relation policy 
and to accept voluntarily recognition of unions and of its employees was 
remarkable in view of the ample warnings that if management failed to do 
so then the government would be obliged to intervene. It did so 
gradually. 
In 1898 the Erdman Act was passed which prevented discrimination 
against union activity in the railroads, making it a misdemeanor. Shortly 
thereafter, this act was declared unconstitutional. In 1932 the Norris 
LaGuardia Act was passed through Congress. This was primarily concerned 
with the judicial procedure involving labor injunctions, although it con-
tained a statement of policywhich endorsed the right of employees to llfull 
freedom of associations, self organization ••• to negotiate the terms and 
conditions of • •• employment • • • free from interference, restraint or 
coercions of employers"•* 
Wit h the advent of the Roosevelt administration the legislative 
endorsement of the right to unionism and collective bargaining advanced 
quickly. In 1933 the National Industry Recovery Act was enacted which 
offered the most complete government endorsement of collective bargaining 
up to that time, but effective penalties were lac1dng. In 1934 the National 
Labor Relation Board was adopted which attempted to overcome the opposition 
of business within the framework and limited sanctions of the 'National 
Recovery Act, but again success was lacking. Its life was short as this act 
was also declared unconstitutional. 
*13, p 1013 
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In 1935 the Wagner Act was passed which was, without a doubt, 
the most significant labor law ever enacted within the United States. 
It pledged the government to aid employees in securing inde-
pendent organizations free from employer interference •••• 
Congress virtually ordered employers to stop resisting the 
spread of unionism, telling them that the desire of their 
employees to organize was none of their business and to keep 
their hands off.* 
The heart of the law was Section 7 which stated that employees, 
shall have the right to self-organization, to form to join or 
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing and to engage in con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
other mutual aid or protection.** 
The present N.L.R.B. was a result of this law and its powers 
were (1) to present employer unfair practices and (2) to determine whether 
a union represented a group of employees for the purpose of collective 
bargaining. 
The government has also thrice set minimum wage rates since the 
Wage Hour Law of 1938 which legally fixes minimum wage rates, overtime pay 
and set maximum hours. These conditions presently stand at a one dollar 
minimum wage, time and a half for overtime and forty hours maximum straight 
time hours. 
The Wagner Act was under severe criticism, both public and 
industrial, since its inception in 1935 until its amendment twelve years 
later. Indeed, the act was regarded as so serious a threat by same business 
interests that its repeal constituted a principle emphasis of the N.A.M. 
after 1935. 
Beginning in 1941 a series of bills were introduced into the 
House which were to modify the act, only to be tied up in the Senate Labor 
Committee. In 1946 the Case Bill was passed through Congress only to be 
*14, p 256 
**l5, p 94 
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vetoed by President Truman. The stage was set for further attempts at 
restrictive legislation by the serious wave of strikes which pervaded the 
country in 1946. An all t i me high of 113 million man days was lost - a 
figure three times higher than the previous year or in. 1937, the two worst 
- . 
years up to that time. The nation was paralyzed by strikes in essential 
industries such as coal, public-utilities, etc •• * 
Thus ended an important stage of national labor policy in this 
country. The attitude toward collective bargaining had passed through a 
succession of stages, from active hostility in the early 1880's when labor 
was prosecuted as a conspiracy, to active encouragement of union organization 
under the Wagner Act. 
It is interesting to compare Section 7 of the Wagner Act and the 
revised wording of the Taft Hartley Act: 
Employees shall have the right to self-organization • • • for the 
purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection 
and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such 
activities.** ' 
The government had now accepted a "neutral" policy concerning 
collective bargaining, recognizing the right to or not to organize. Whether 
or not such neutrality is possible remains debatable. As amended in 1951 
the chief policy changes brought about by the Taft Hartley Act were: (1) the 
closed shop in which an employee must be a union member to attain a job, was 
outlawed and (2) the union shop, to which a non-union member may be hired 
on condition that he join the union or resign after a trial period, was 
hedged about with certain conditions but was not prohibited.~** 
During the period in which the act had operated the demand for 
labor was high and employers, to maintain sufficient labor, sustained from 
*16, p 94 
**17, p 1039 
*'H<-18, p 168 
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using powers given which could severely limit union activity. There has been 
an interest, prior to the present investigations, to revise the act but 
feelings have changed since . 
14 
In a recent report from the Senate Labor Committee, Congress was 
urged to legislate against the types of abuses which were found in their 
investigations of the Teamsters, Bakery Workers, Textile Workers, Operating 
Engineers and the Allied Industrial Workers. In the findings that accompanied 
its recommendations, the committee held that "in excess of $10,000,000" had 
been misused or stolen by officials of the five internationals studied. If 
this investigation is to have any significance, which it undoubtedly will, 
legislation in the health and welfare administration, at least, can be 
expected. 
Union Objectives: 
Essentially there is no 11 labor movementtt in this country. Instead 
there is a polyglot of competing organizations. There are binding ties 
which hold most of these organizations through the internationals, of course. 
Despite evident diversities, hm;ever, unions share many aims and for the 
most part woul d pursue similar policies if confronted with the same set of 
circumstances. Consequently it may we well to consider policies in the form 
of general objectives that influence union policy.* 
Prior to this it might be important to illnstrate that early unions 
were based on radical ends which were truly revolutionary. This was a short 
lived era as people were unfavorable to any such ideas. Since that time 
unions have been extremely conservative in mentioning anything further than 
immediate ends . 
Union policies presume to achieve not only the goals of the 
members but also the goals of union leadership. The two are not always 
identical. The discussion of workers motivation and behavior would in-
dicate the following: job security, freedom from oppressive supervision 
from employers, friendly atmosphere on the job as well as improveme~ts in 
economic well being. Unions generally seek to promote these objectives by 
negotiating written agreements with employers. 
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Union leadership both formulates and executes union policy. The 
leaders of a union generally seek to promote union strength and to maintain 
themselves in office. The leadership of a national or international is likely 
to be interested in the union's development as an institution. Therefore, 
the union leaders may be willing to sacrifice or forego a wage increase for 
the acceptance of a union shop. 
In considering union policies one must bear in mind that they are 
designed to protect the workers' inte~est as employees and, as a result, 
rightly or wrongly, stress minimum human cost at work rather than the lowest 
money costs of products at retail, maximum human satisfaction and development 
on the job rather than maximum consumer satisfaction. Perhaps it is not the 
most perfect way of solving a conflict but it is a practical approach to the 
problem. 
As it might appear, the foregoing analysis is not concerned with 
the ultimate goals of union policy. The union is moved by expediency. Its 
needs or demands are gove~ed by what it conceives to be the necessities of 
the moment. A broader plan or purpose is lacking, or better, has not yet 
been developed. Perhaps the most general aim of the union movement is the 
betterment of the worker in all phases of his activity. If there was a 
standard view on this subject it would probably come close to that of George W. 
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Brooks of the powerful Pulp, Sulfite and Paper Workers union who said, 
"Labor's objectives of making today better than yesterday are predicated 
on an acceptance of capitalism"•* 
The ground work principle of the American labor movement 
has been to recognize that first things come first. The 
primary essential in our mission has been the protection 
of the wage worker, now •••• These in the nature of things, 
I repeat, were and are the primary object of trade 
unionism.** 
Dominant in labor's wants are security and improvements. A secure and rising 
income are central. These will be the things which unions will be striving 
for - some form of an annual wage, a share in the fruits of increased 
productivity and pension and wage increases. Perhaps protection from 
competition from other workers and from arbitrary discharge or unfair treat-
ment from the boss are others. 
Management Objectives: 
It appears as though American management would prefer not to deal 
with unions. This is true, although changing. Present day actions and 
statements of employers and employer associations indicate a fairly wide-
spread acceptance of collective bargaining and ways of making it a workable 
process. It would be unwise to assume that management is entirely pleased 
about such a conclusion. }~gement has had to adjust to such circumstances 
and will necessarily continue to do so in the future. The degree of 
reluctance will depend upon the severity or difficulty of adjustment. 
Management, like workers, attempts to live up to certain goals or 
objectives. The question of which goal in management is primary proposes a 
problem. It appears as though "respect", in its broadest context, would be 
uppermost. Consider the first goal - the respect of society and ones fellow 
*20, p 55 
iH~21, p 99 
workers. The many community activities of management indicate a desire to 
have society respect their position • . 
There are times, as I sit behind a desk piled high with the days 
unread correspondence, when I stare darkly out of the window •••• 
Trying to see me are three executives who would like to remind 
me, if they dared, that we're in business to make a profit and 
that I must spend some time on the problem of sales, manufac-
turing, and development. There is a Community Chest meeting in 
five minutes, and a directors' meeting tomorrmv morning, neither 
of wi1ich I am prepared for •••• It seems to me that none of us 
can find solutions to problems bigger than our immediate 
material progress. 
The truth is that Americans are just about as busy with their 
non-official, under-remunerated, voluntary activities as they 
are with their official duties; and these unpaid, unofficial 
off-duty activities have a deeper, more lasting effect upon 
American life, and even American policies, than do the official 
ones.* 
Another goal of management is that of economic security. They are 
interested in bettering their position economically through increased pay 
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and side benefits such as stock options. They are less interested in security 
in the sense of future remuneration as their present income allows them to 
prepare now rather than have the company do so. A third goal is that of 
obtaining an increased control over their own affairs. This is not a personal 
ambition but a state which is felt necessary to the success of their 
positions . 
The controller should not be controlled. The director should not 
be led by those he is controlling, directing or leading. The 
person responsible for manipulating, weaving together, 
coordinating has to have a pretty big area of discretion in 
making decisions and making changes. If he has the responsibility 
for the success or failure of a project he ought to have the 
authority equivalent to his responsibility.~H* 
Within management, men do their jobs according to rules laid down 
by management as a group; but those rules were laid down by other managers . 
*22, p 23 
**23, p 248 
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It is a different matter when they are made by nan-management. Now the union 
has challenged this control and the devices of control by attempting to con-
trol the second factor of production, labor, which, rightly or wrongly, was 
within the scope of management. 
Management can control people down the line but they cannot 
regulate a union official, nor have they any say in his election. This 
appears to be contrary to the very nature of the entrepreneur who is a 
regulating or controling device, although the power to control all the 
factors of production should not. be absolute. Management must share with 
unions the factor of labor . The other factors should belong to management 
in order to fulfill their function. 
Unions of course interfere with all this. They regulate the 
manager to the extent of forcing their_policies upon him, they destroy his 
freedom, they seek a voice in control, they work for group solidarity and 
destroy competition among workers instead of the differential awards manage-
ment would like to offer. They establish uniform rules, set quotas and 
hold men back from doing their best . Concluding from this, it appears as 
though unions work in defiance of basic economic laws, which are the basis 
of a capitalistic system. 
Concerning prerogatives the following quote may be enlightening. 
"Labor wouldn't even agree to an effort to define the functions 
of management although we made a real effort to get that issue 
settled. We drew up a list of thirty-odd specific acts, such 
as the determination of prices, accounting procedures and so 
forth, which seemed clear to us must be reserved to management. 
Labor refused to accept a single one, and we were told officially 
by one of the labor delegates that the reason that they had 
refused was that at some future date labor may want to bring any 
one of these functions into the realm of collective bargaining.* 
*24, p 144 
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Of course, one must differentiate between the aims of management 
and the "corporation". The corporation is interested in profits and 
efficiency. These aims might be construed to be part of the aims of manage-
ment, because it is management that brings them about. 
It might be further pointed out that the aims or interests of the 
worker and employer are similar in regard to material objects. Unions have 
accomplished a coup d 1 etat through strikes and other deceptive means for their 
loyalty and have now set up a contrary pole. All men should be allowed to 
work for whomever and wherever they please, so a union that regiments this, 
interferes with personal freedom and the efficient distribution of the 
nations labor force in theoretical capitalism at least. 
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CHAPT:rt III 
THE ca;FLICT 
Unions and managenent are not ltpartners in indust.ryn , contrary to 
a pr evalent myth. Like athletic teams, the representatives of these two 
institut ions are m1gaged L~ a competitive pattern . Personal anL~osities , 
hatreds and unfair actions occassionally occur but they are not inalienable, 
inher ent or ine'vitable . However, ">'rhen the t\70 teams come up to the line, an 
element of belli gerency is bound to exist . 
~~erican labor history has been the rdstory of a lonG attempt 
to r ec oncile two conflicting views of what the wor ld looked 
like - the eillployers vieWs of opportunity and reward, the 
employees view of arbitr ary and discriminat:ing actions by 
those >7ho had ec onomic pmrer over him.* 
The conflict is hutlan. At its core are people with certain 
dl vergent i nt er ests and motives .. Each perceives the achievement of its 
goals as interfer ed ·with by the other . .:;magemcnt is bound to the stod:-
holders in the f01"'m of eli vidends and labor is bou.~d to its znembers in the 
form of benefit s .. Represent ativea on b oth sides are, therefore, professionals 
whos e duty it is to a chieve the best possible bargain . Although they may 
ar rive at mutually b eneficial r esults , i t is nor e frequent that a gain on 
one side constitutes a loss f or the other . Each s i de is cons t an tly on 
guar d against the invasions of tho other; each abays seek ng advantages for 
us e in bar gaining against the other . Obviously there is no share of interests . 
A fundamental point should be el:'lphasized. In most cases , the 
e!!!ployer gives and the employees receives f rom him more monoy or other 
objects which have a positive worth on the market . The employer must receive 
these things from t he consumer . Ee does s o by providi:tg customers with what 
tho:v -r.ant and are Willing to pay for . The employer is seldom able to promis e 
not to hurt tho constuner; t hey want something more positive, a good product, 
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and it is this that they receive. Seldom does a union say, "Pay us more and 
we will produce more". Usually the offer is, "Pay us more or we will strike. 
Wage Price Spiral: 
Perhaps the most apparent conflict between labor and management 
is in the desires or aims of these two institutions - wages and profits. 
Unions naturally are interested in increasing wages as much as possible for 
their members because it constitutes income, no more than management is 
similarly inclined so as to make as much profit for their owners, wages, 
being a cost of production, limit this possibility. In economic terms this 
is called the "wage-price spiral" - an increase in one necessitates an 
increase in the other to the detriment of the consumer. 
Contrast the view of th~ employer and employee on a wage increase 
of five cents per hour. To the employee this means an increase of two 
dollars per week, assuming a 40 hour week. But suppose the employer has 
5,000 employees. In this instance an increase of five cents per hour means 
a cost of production increase of 520,000 dollars. An increase such as this 
would probably demand a corresponding increase in price. Consequently, it 
is not surprising that the conflict exists. 
Basically it is a problem concerning government fiscal policy 
which sets a basis for such demand increases. The failure of the government 
to provide the proper atmosphere allows a basis for such increases in wages 
and prices, although it is highly improbable that labor will cease to raise 
wages. An increased cost to business in the form of increased wages only 
allows a justification for price rises. A study of the national income 
charts will illustrate that the position of labor has been relatively 
stable, maintaining approximately 66%. But price~ have risen accordingiy. 
Where the total level of money income is achieved, full 
employment cannot be maintained if product sellers and/or 
workers continually insist on pressing for higher prices and/or 
wages . The upward cycle of prices, costs and income that re-
sult in inflation as money demands outrun productive 
capacities .* 
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Union spokesmen declare that employment declines not because wages 
are too high but because they are too low. In an address spelling out the 
philosophy underlying the U.A.W. (A.F.L. - C. I.O.) resolution of December, 
1957, Walter P. Reuther, President of the U.A.W., said that it is "big 
business" not labor that is taking "a disproportionately large share of the 
fruits of our . developing economy'' . He advocated higher 11 take home pay'' and 
"lower take home profits11 for corporations "to protect the equity of the 
American Consumer" . 
Curiously enough, "the ratio of wages to prices, which measures 
the wage earner's power to purchase the out-put, has risen with productivity, 
that is, with the average out-put per man-hour of labor" ·** When money 
rages increase faster than productivity, as they have since the post-war 
period, prices rise enough to absorb the increases in wages and tend to 
restrict the gain in purchasing power of wages to the amount of the gain in 
productivity.~,Ht The question of who is chasing the other seems to be 
another solution which appears impossible . 
This wage price spiral is just an outward way of expressing 
the more basic problem of inflation which occurs when the 
purchasing pm1er of the monetary unit is declining or when 
an increase in the total money demand for goods and services, 
total spending, is not offset by an increase in the total 
*26, .p 249 
-**27, pp 213-214 
***28, p 2 
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supply of goods and services.* 
Inflation: 
Seeing that the wage price spiral can be attributed to inflation, 
a solution in this area may be more than helpful. 
Presently we are caught in a vicious circle. The more government 
spends, the more inflation; the more inflation, the higher are government 
expenses. A further circular increase is continuing in the area of labor 
costs, which bring higher prices, more inflation, then still higher prices 
and wages until the bubble bursts as it must.** 
Recently, Richard J. Grey, president of the A.F.L. - C.I.O. 
Building and Construction Trades Department, suggested that the building 
trade unions refrain from making further wage demands this year. He 
feared that the demands contribute to inflation which brings about tight 
money and less "construction and more unemployment". To say that his 
reasoning is falacious is a mistake for it is correct as far as it goes . 
11Th ere is no doubt that productivity increases have been outrun by wage 
increases in recent years.*** It appears obvious that this condition can 
lead to an inflationary spiral. Such unjustified increases are the result 
of monopolistic power granted to unions through their exemption from the 
Clayton Act. While such disproportionate increases can accelerate inflation, 
they are no more the root cause than price increases are.~~~~ 
Union monopoly brings about featherbedding and restrictive 
practices which sap the productive power of the country and at the same 
time soak up the benefits which should result from innovation. Unless the 
*29, p 214 
*Y~3o, p 9 
-lH'&31, p 9 
iP.H:-* 3 2, p 9 
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present trend of giving less and less work for more and more money is 
reversed, our productive power will so decline that we achieve full employ-
ment in a declining economy. What good will it do labor to get higher 
and higher wages if the members find themselves getting paid with a dollar 
that is almost worthless . 
The fact is that labor's present productivity is largely the 
result of better equipment and innovation in productive knowledge. 
A worker's out-put per hour, in the sense of how much he 
puts into it, has been declining over the years. The 
increased productivity is the result of constantly 
increased efficiency of capital goods, paid for by 
capitalists.* 
The incentive to expand and to reinvest earnings in more 
productive machinery must not be lost due to the certainty that any 
increased productivity of machines will be soaked up by labor and any 
increased profit will be consumed by taxes. 
The real trouble is not increased pay for increased out-put f or 
as long as goods and services are increased in relation to wages, inflation 
will remain stagnant. The wage price spiral is an immediate cause of 
inflation . It is partly union monopoly, administered prices and the 
government. 
Personality Differences: 
The concept of a union official and a management official are 
different in regards to their personalities. The type of union personnel 
are changing in personality. A large section of the "old line" leaders to 
not think in terms of cooperation. Those who have had a lang tenure of 
office (average length of the international president's term of office in 
ten "representative unions" is said to be 26 years, which is lengthY**) have 
*33, p 162 
**34, p 64 
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gained and held their power by being fighters and are not likely to change. 
Those who are subject to frequent elections (local officials) consider their 
re-election their most important objective. They must "sell a package" 
and deliver higher wages, shorter hours and better working conditions. The 
easiest way for unions to achieve these objects is to let "management 
deliver the package by finding the means". Gradually this type of leader 
has been replaced by a new and more dynamic type. Until recently, by far, 
the greater majority of union leaders were older men who were well set in 
their ways. Today this has changed. 
The "new" leaders may be well versed in economics and are often 
highly sophisticated in argumentation and also tend to consider the scope 
of management-labor relations as inadequate. They judge these relations by 
the extent to which reasonable suggestions are given effect. This type is 
interested in having a greater amount of say so that they might better help 
the worker. 
The rank and file leaders are usually less competent because they 
arise directly from the membership and, thus, their educational qualifications 
are rather poor. 
Union leaders as well as policy are in a constant flux. What a 
leader said yesterday may mean little today. Perhaps an extreme but illus-
trative example will suffice. 
Where Walter Reuther stood politically was never exactly clear. 
He was certainly not an "ordinary socialist". The element of certainty in 
his many 11Reuther Plans" showed the technocracy of Reuther. But there was 
no doubt whatever 11 that he believed in some sort of a class struggle and in 
some sort of socialism and in a labor party 'to bring about the necessary 
change in the system' " • * 
*35, p 272 
Yet, the biggest labor event of 1959, if not the entire post-war 
period, was contracted by him that goes further in its affirmation of the 
free enterprise system and of the workers' stake in it than any other 
contract signed in this country. 
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The G.M. contract is the first that unmistakably accepts the 
existing distribution between wages and income and profits as "nominal if 
not fair". The contract accepted objective economic facts - cost of living, 
productivity, etc. - as determining wages. Another interesting point is 
that it is one of the very few contracts which accepts both the management 
function and that management works in the direct interest of labor. 
Perhaps the latest "Reutherism11 is his profit sharing plan which 
will illustrate how union policy changes. The U .A. W. has been the greatest 
antagonist of profit sharing plans in union history. Within~ the last five 
years Ford offered a stock option plan, which is clearly based on the 
profitability of a company, which was adamantly refused. Today negotiations 
,are in progress with the "Big Three11 for sharing in "excess profits". It 
would appear as though this is a contradiction but it is merely a change in 
union policy which appears as ' though is the only constant. 
The American businessman has changed also, but not as completely. 
Due to the prevalence of unionism and the necessity of its acceptance, the 
businessman has been forced to adapt to its existence and conform accor-
dingly. He does not attempt to eradicate unionism as his predecessors did, 
but rather limit its gains. He is more interested in the continuing 
operation and if he must concede to union demands it will be through com-
promise, conceding as little as possible. 
The manager has had to seek the respect of a new group, union 
officers, if for nothing else than being good business. The second thing 
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is that the union is likely to change his problems of winning respect of 
his workers. The third result is that management's socially accepted roles 
are redefined. He has to share the stage wi. th a new partner and the ability 
to play the role depends upon cooperation from both partners. Also, manage-
ment must weave his actions with people who have the power to trip him up, 
set him back, confuse him and, what is worse, make him a failure. In 
another respect, it is harder to play the role because they are played 
according to new rules and standards. Prior to this, the rules and pro-
cedures were pretty well standardized and it was within managerial discretion 
to change them. 
Managerial positions and labor leaders are involved in a basic 
shift in the balance of power and prestige. Had the issues 
between management and labor been merely wages, hours and 
working conditions, particularly since 1930, there might be 
some chance of an early reduction of residual bitterness or 
elation which makes peaceful action difficult. The main 
battle, however, was, and is, over a shift in prestige in 
industry and in the community between leaders of labor and 
industry. Both of them lmow it. The rest of us know it. 
The leaders of labor have risen rapidly in their ability t o 
influence the course of events in this country. The gain 
has been at the expense of some of the power and prestige 
formerly possessed by management and employers.* 
Industrial Council Plan: 
Concerning solutions made by groups and individuals, the following 
have been offered: a "consumers' conunonwealth11 which envisages enterprise 
as being run by cooperatives, Socialism and Communism among others. Per-
haps the only one which offers a solution of some value is that of Pope 
Pius XI, and for this reason it alone will be considered. 
Pope Pius XI, in his encyclical 11Quadragesimo Anno called for a 
general reorganization of society in all its phases and the inception of 
the "Industrial Council Plan11 • Catholic social thinkers have devoted a good 
*36, p 894 
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deal of attention to such an idea, especially since the publication of the 
above mentioned encyclical. 
The basic principle for such a plan is that, "Neither capital can 
do w:t thou t labor, nor labor without capital".* If both employers and 
workers have a common interest in the healthy prosperity of the national 
economy• why should it not be legitimate to give to the workers a just share 
in the responsibilities of the organization and development of that 
economy. Such a statement is not to be denied, for without cooperation, no 
society can exist • 
••• since the interest is common, why should it not be 
manifest in a common outward expression? Why should it 
not be allowable to assign to the workers a just share 
in the responsibility and development of that economy?~~~ 
Industrial Democracy refers to the control of economic life and the dis-
tribution of jointly produced income. With respect to control, it envisages 
a scheme of economic organization in which the union limits or disposes of 
industrial autocracy. The emphasis of the industry council plan is upon 
unity, rather than diversity, and the common good, rather than the indivi-
dual good with liberty being an integral part of the plan as is also the 
principle of subsidiarity and self-government. 
As Pope Pius Xii said, concerning the common good, society cannot 
be a struggle of the rich against the poor. 
Today, men have the opportunity of deciding whether they will 
continue to follow a policy of one-sided and short-sighted 
11Quest for Profit" or, rather, will begin to look toward the 
totality of the social economy, with its objective ends.~P.{"* 
The organic structure of society must be changed due to the 
labor-management relation, although this is not the sole reason. This 
*31, p 13, par. 100 
iHE-38, p 10, par. 65 
~Hf-39, p 23 
change is to be brought about by a more unified society based on the 
supposition that all people are attempting to achieve the same objective 
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end - happiness which is what the common good is to achieve. The principle 
of subsidiarity is the reason why such a plan can be put into practice. If 
it is felt that the conflice is so severe and enterprise is doing little or 
nothing to alleviate the sittlation, then a higher power, the government, has 
a clear right to undertake the responsibility for the betterment of society. 
This undertaking will not remain in the hands of the government but will be 
given to councils composed of labor and capital which will replace the 
individual control of management. The hierarchical structure of these 
councils has yet to be decided but there are several proposals to this 
effect. Such a procedure takes from the government work which, through the 
principle of subsidiarity, society can partake of. It is claimed that 
one's liberty will be frustrated under such circumstances but, an the con-
trary, it will be increased. It is correctly pointed out that liberty is 
not a synonym for license. Liberty acquires authority as a deterrent from 
generation into license. One is only free to do what is right. Such a plan 
is to bring about liberty in the true sense VThile limiting what is called 
license. 
Now that an objective statement of the plan has been made, an 
evaluation is in order. As was mentioned before, labor and capital must 
cooperate to bring about the fruits of any economy. Jointly they produce 
products and income. Because both are attempting to achieve the same 
end - monetary gain - does that mean a merger is in order? Are there not 
similar ways of achieving the same end? If one attempts to merge both of 
these two institutions it will become, for all practical purposes, a public 
control of enterprise - a basic tenet of socialism. This is by no means the 
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end of the plan. Such a position is not to come about spontaneously but, 
"Salvation and justice are not to be found in revolution but evoluticn" •* 
At first these boards are to become advisory and then gradually assume more 
responsibility as they become capable. 'Another question is, ttHow much is more"? 
Vlhat the plan actually proposes is that the problem of economic 
organization be met by forcing the employer to share his power with employees 
under industry-wide arrangements which disenfranchise the consumer who will 
then be unable to control the economy by casting his dollar votes in the 
competitive market. This plan is democratic in a limited sense only as it 
claims that two producer groups should exercise authority rather than 
one - which brings about bureaucracy. 
The plan itself is idealistic and perhaps rather difficult to be 
put into practice. Professor Schumpeter remarked that the plan was well 
thought out but it would be extremely difficult to place in practice unless 
the society was all Catholic or, at least, the greater majority. It appears 
as though this plan has the same basic problem as Communism, namely, can 
one's human nature be changed? Justice is to be brought about through a 
development of the individual rather than artificial inception through a 
plan. Furthermore, 
Individualism has been the main-spring of our economic and 
political system. Anything that hampers the individual's 
opportunity to take advantage of his superior worth or "grasp 
the main chance" breaks the ma:in-spring.** 
One point must be made clear when discussing such a proposal. 
To dispute the principle that labor and capital must work together is 
falacious. If one looks back on some of the contemporary economic thinkers, 
*40, p lhB 
**hl, p 249 
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one can easily see that their feelings toward labor and the theories which 
resulted from such perverted thinking are wrong both from a moral and 
economic viewpoint. The consideration that labor should be treated fairly 
through just wages and considerate working conditions is undeniable. 
\ 
CHAPTER IV 
A SOLUTION 
In the ideal, a person becomes an entrepreneur precisely because 
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he feels he is capable of producing a good or service which will accrue into 
profits. It is he, and only he, who is entitled to control or regulate the 
enterprise as he sees fit, provided he is acting in conformity with the 
moral law toward the common good. Unions, being unnecessary, the government 
or any other o~tside force would have no right to interfere. For all 
practical purposes this might be classified as an absolute right, conditioned 
only by the connnon good. 
A clean slate was provided for entrepreneurships during the origin 
of our country. For more than a hundred years management was free to act 
as they saw fit . Their failure to bring about such a moral atmosphere is 
obvious. Industry proceeded to merge and consolidate, assuming these out-
side forces could not effect such a powerful institution. Wages were kept 
at a minimum, hours and working conditions became unbearable; the consumer 
was a slave. Hovrever, management's falacious assumption was proven wrong 
in two instances. The government was forced to act because the consumer had 
to be protected, and was. This was accomplished through legislation. 
Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Howard Taft inaugurated an era of "trust-
busting". Management still had the opportunity to act on its own initiative 
concerning labor conditions. Labor had been kept in a suppressed condition 
since the beginnings of America, but this condition progressed to the 
unimaginable. There is no doubt that management did not profit from such 
conditions. The more labor was suppressed, the lower the operating costs 
and the higher the profits. The short run advantages were high, as they 
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usually are. But beyond this point the advantages became disadvantages. 
Their failure to improve labor conditions again forced the government to act 
through exemption of labor from anti-trust legislation. The atmosphere was 
widened by positive legislation which forced industry to recognize the 
existence of unions and to bargain in good faith. 
Even a purely materialistic view would have shown that a few 
minor concessions at the opportune time could have prevented such outside 
intervention but even this was too much to concede. It is much easier to 
see this in retrospect, indeed. Enterprise lost, not only for themselves, 
but also for their posterity, the right to conduct an enterprise as an 
entrepreneur should because they lacked the foresight to attend to their 
obligations. 
If one were to judge the present state of labor relations by 
events in the arena of public policy, one might reasonably conclude that 
here was the crudest of power struggles. There are companies that have been 
cited for their constructive bargaining relationships with the union but 
which have, at the same time, been caught as supporters of the most restrictive 
labor legislation. There are those labor leaders who are mild enough across 
the bargaining table but who rave wildly when they talk about what the law 
of the land ought to be. Indeed uncamprimising loyalty to one's side is 
nowhere stronger than in debate over such legislation. 
The hearings of the Both Congress which preceded passage of 
the Taft-Hartley Act are a good case in point: one reads 
through four volumes of testimony seeking almost in vain 
for calm rational statements that describe the greys rather 
than the blacks and whites of collective bargaining. The 
wonder of it all is that, so few of the witnesses and Congress-
men own up to saying that there are situations where strong 
unions bargain together in relative harmony and 'vithout 
government interference there emerges legislation which is 
more unrealistic than present labor law.* 
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The ironic note is that persons who testified expressed strong 
belief against government interference in collective bargaining, feeling 
that the problem should be handled by those directly concerned. Yet the 
sincerity of this belief as applied to general legislation by government 
seldom prevented a man from proposing his own pet legislation. If all these 
11pet legislations" were dravm together and placed under one law there would 
emerge labor law which would be far wider in scope than has ever been knovm. 
Such a situation suggests that the trend to more and more legis-
lation may be inevitable precisely because the men who propose legislation 
delude themselves; they do not hesitate to propose their own pet l egis-
lation but they adamantly refuse to recognize government interference. 
The proved possibility of harmonious industrial relations, plus 
the serious fact that even the most bitter strikes usually end with some 
form of agreement, often leads people to say, ''Now why coul dn't t hey have 
gotten together in the first place". The question is particularly likely 
when the strike has inconvenienced the public or when the issue is apparently 
very small, the difference between a 13 and 15 cent increase. Usually there 
is little difference between the demands made but there are subconscious 
feelings of hatred between the parties which are covered over by these 
external manifestations. 
It seems difficult to understand how two ratiooal groups cannot 
settle differences without making reference to the strike or lockout. There 
is no doubt as to the desirability of industrial peace and the need to learn 
as much as possible about its achievement. This must not, however, be the 
dominant objective to which free collective bargaining should be directed 
in a democratic society. The trend toward closer and closer accommodation 
seems unmistakable. Obviously there are set-backs periodically but the 
peaceful movement is advancing steadily. 
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Industrial harmony is certainly not perfect harmony. If harmony 
means that every person in every group gets what he wants - or even less 
than what he wants - v.rithout having to fight for it we shall never achieve 
industrial harmony; and we had better not set up a good so illusary.* The 
definition of industrial harmony allows room for much of this conflict. It 
is the essence of democracy. Society should not be based on nice and sen-
sitive men but on just, responsible and intelligent men. 
Obviously there is not so much industrial peace that we can speak 
of "conflict" in the past tense. There is much collective bargaining which 
lies between harmonious accommodation and the all out war type - by far the 
greater majority. This is where the two parties see it as their function to 
contain their conflicts of interests within certain bounds. They do not 
love each other - management still thinks it would be a better world if 
unions had never come to be and unions still think that management is 
driven by nothing more than the cold-blooded maximization of profits with 
a consequent to squeeze out of the worker the most for the least money. 
But the. parties to this relationship are also reconciled to the fact that 
they are going to be living together for quite some while to come. 
In evaluating such a relationship it can be fairly well assumed 
that few have anything good to say for disorderly relationships. The gain 
produced, if any, may well be canceled from society's point of view by the 
costs which they entail in bitterness, in serious harm to individuals and in 
more lost production time than be cmdoned. What can be concluded from the 
more orderly forms of conflict? T\Jo conclusions result: a certain amount 
of conflict is inevitable and a certain amount is desirable. 
*43, p 448 · 
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Such conflict is desirable in an economy which is to continue 
expanding for two reasons. The first being the "theory of countervailing 
powers" which claims that our economy is composed of powers which set up 
competing power blocks resulting in a system of checks and balances which 
prevent one side from assuming an all power position at the expense of the 
other; organized labor and business have all these qualifications. The 
second argument is the view that one of the main functions of a union is to 
make wages so high as to force an increase in technological innovation to 
replace labor. If such is true then the conflict is desirable to the 
extent that it produces a higher standard of living. It might be poi nted 
out that without this innovation our economy would require the use of five 
billion slaves to achieve our present living standard. The argument is 
based on an expanding economy and if this continues then there is no better 
reason for unions to demand the perpetual "more". This idea seems contrary 
to the principles which unions are now using, namely, featherbedding, and 
should be taken accordingly. 
Again the question comes up, can industrial peace be an end in 
itself. Would it not bring about complacency to the detriment of the con-
sumer? Will ambition become lacking? An obsession of lost costs neglects to 
bring about the gains which might result from a strike - increased awareness 
of the other problems, new recognition of the value of compromise, etc •• 
Resting on such a foundation, industrial peace may be productive as well as 
stable. 
The above does not mean that we are to remain in a status quo 
position. Progress must be made. Time answers many problems, the last 
being the most severe. According to Judge Gary who was speaking before 
the Presidents of U. S. Steel Corporation, 11The only way of combatting and 
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overcoming the present wave of unrest is for employers, the capitalists, 
those having the greatest amount of education, the greatest power and 
influence to so manage their affairs that there be no just ground for 
criticism". 
Education and responsibility must be instilled into those who are 
in a position to spread it, not only the capitalists. There is no question 
that the norm of education is constantly increasing which will help to 
alleviate many present problems. Constructive government legislation must 
be had where necessary and the resumption of freedom where not. Perhaps these 
two areas offer the most potential for success. 
Concerning a positive solution to the conflict, the follmring 
should be considered. The basis for good relations between these two parties 
is good faith - the recognition that each could accomplish its objectives 
to some extent only through the other and each must act on this assumption. 
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Labor's attitude should hold promise of 1'constructive possibilities" 
such as the absence of strikes and violence, a well administered contract, 
a smooth working grievance process and a general interest in the well being 
of the company. Secondly, management's right to direct must not be 
challenged - a position to be defended on the grounds of the necessity for 
conserving management's powers, the stockholders' interest and the ful-
filling of a responsibility to employers by safeguarding their individual 
freedom against invasion by organized groups. 
The owner of the means of production, whoever he be - individual 
owner, workers association, or corporation - must always, within 
the limits of public economic laws - retain control of his 
economic decisions.* 
Labor must also consider that the economic contributions of 
cooperation should outweigh its cost. 
Management, then, has the obligation to the owners to maximize 
profits and improve the company's competitive position by 
increasing efficiency of production and distribution. It also 
has an obligation to the consuming public to improve the product 
by the same means. -r.-
Entrepreneurial authority, whether in the hands of the union 
or not, must satisfy the consumer, not the worker if the firm 
is to survive.** 
Management must hold to the condition that cooperation should not 
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threaten the organizational security of the union because such a threat causes 
the union to use all their pmver. Management must also consider that labor 
and the public are to be considered in its decisions. 
Management has the obligations, not only to the owners whom it 
directly represents but also the employees it hires and directs, 
to the particular community where its plants or offices are 
located, and to the larger economic order of which it forms 
a part.*** 
Both the owner's right to profit and the public's right to a 
better product must take into account labor's right to as good 
an income and as much security of income as circumstances allovl. i:-;pa 
The purpose of economic life is to achieve the natural and super-
natural end of man, whether he wishes it or not. To accomplish this the 
mediate end of working to achieve wealth, is necessary, resulting in the 
"end of the work", namely, a product. This, then, the production and 
distribution of goods and services which supplies wealth for human use, 
the mediate end, is the end of the economic order. The material end, 
dividends, profits and wages, of this activity is necessary to individual 
lives and the continued operation of the economic order, the end of the 
worker being subordinate to the end of the work. 
*4.5, p 209 
**46, p 169 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
INFLA. TION IN GENERAL 
Nature and Types of Inflation 
Standard Definition of Inflation 
Inflation has had many connotations pinned to it. Inflation 
has usually been thought of in the past as monetary inflation. The 
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period of one type of inflation - monetary inflation - has ended. Inflation 
in 1958 was not just one type of inflation~ but a composite of maQY types. 
It is a unique phenomenon to which past solutions of inflation cannot be 
applied. The past standard definition of inflation has been "an excess of 
money chasing an inadequate supply of goods . " Under this type of inflation 
the rise in prices has become the distinguishing characteristic. Here the 
value of goods would rise as a result of competitive bidding. This has been 
the history that has characterized the American business scene since the 
early 19401 s .* 
Types of Inflation 
When total demand is strong the wage-price spiral may rise rapidly. 
It is argued that even when total demand is weak and when appreciable un-
employment exists this "seller• s inflation" may still forge ahead. Unionized 
wages and administered prices existing in our economy mean persistent secular 
inflation. The traditional view suggests that the classical "demand-pull" 
inflation will prevail only if the money supply increases more rapidly than 
total output of goods and services .** 
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No seller, labor or industry, may escape the test of the market, 
no matter how administered its prices m~ be. Widespread sales losses 
inevitably occur when prices outrWl the ability of consumer incomes to 
purchase desired goods. A cost-push, administered-price inflation cannot 
continue indefinitely unless there is a growing total demand in the economy. 
But, there will be persistent excess demand if the government and its 
agencies assures it. 
Classical Automatic Economic Regulator to Restrain Extensive Wage 
Inflation: 
There is one faction which treats these new "wage inflation" 
circumstances in a classical fashion in 'Wldch this wage push will be 
inhibited as soon as unemployment rises. Unemployment, it is contended, 
will arise when firms will be priced out of the donestic market and when we 
as a whole are priced out of the foreign markets. At that point, it is 
felt, management-labor bargaining relations will assume more realistic pro-
portions in a non-inflationary pattern.* 
Circumstances Mitigating the Classical Wage Inflation Solution: 
One cannot question the logic involved in the set of premises 
and conclusion stated above. But there are other circumstances of a 
11parastic" nature that have arisen in the postwar era that did not exist 
before it. The main circumstance that mitigates the logic of the classical 
wage inflation solution propounded above is the Full-Employment Act of 1946. 
Congress is committed to maintain as reasonably as possible full levels of 
*51, p 4o6 
employment. However, the rising trend of wages is ballooning all public 
costs into deficit proportions. A~ macroeconomic recessionary tendencies 
in our economy seem to bring about even greater propensities for tax re-
lief and other forms of contra-cyclical spending. 
History of Inflation From 1940 
United States National Monetary History of World War II: 
During the years of World War II the nation was called on to 
finance government outlays which eventuallY reached an annual total 
representing more than 40% of the national output. To meet this desperate 
national need, tax rates were drasticallY elevated. The rates were so 
close to confiscation that only national patriotism under wartime conditions 
can explain its ready acceptance by our citizens as well as the intense 
effort that went into the tremendous production of the war years. And yet 
an even substantially higher level of tax rates would have been required 
to balance the budget. From fiscal 1942 to fiscal 1946 the cumulative 
federal deficit exceeded $200 billion. The gross public debt soared five-
fold from about $55 billion to almost $270 billion.* 
During these years there was clearly "an excess of money chasing 
a shortage of goods," for the wages and salaries paid out in defense pro-
duction were not paralleled by any output of consumption goods to absorb 
them. The excess dollars of the war years were forcably channeled into 
savings. Price controls held in abeyance the excess effective demand in 
comparison to the meager supplies of consumer goods. As a repository for 
the forced savings, the federal government provided the war savings bond. 
*52, p 404 
This absorbed about $40 billion of the excess purchasing power. The rest 
found its way into private and corporate demand deposits, private savings 
deposits, building and loan shares and government securities other than 
savings bonds, such as certificates of indebtedness and treasury bills. 
This enormous, restless hoard of money lay temporarily idle, as the nation 
went about the business of finishing the war. 
Post War Era Characterized By Classical Inflation: 
At the end of the war America was beset by all of the essential 
ingredients of classical inflation, in thoroughly explosive quantities; 
shortages of consumer durables; inadequate dwelling space for twelve 
million veterans with vast amounts of pent-up demand for things they had 
not seen for years; a physical plant in the throes of reconversion and badly 
in need of modernization as well; and a flood tide of liquid assets entering 
the market place. This was "the excess of money chasing the shortage of 
goods. 11 When price controls were removed, the flood tide of funds seeking 
goods overwhelmed the supply of goods, and the price level rose upward in 
a long-term inflationary trend. At the time (and still in existence) the 
devices for controlling inflation were the rationing of credit and the 
price of credit by means of the Federal Reserve's three main controls, namely 
the discount rate, member bank reserves, and the open market activities. In 
that period the tools of the Fed were applicable to the inflation therein 
existing - classical inflation.* 
Inflation of 1958 - Unit Labor Costs Above Good Prices - Result of 
Labor Contract: 
The inflation that we experienced in 1958 was not the "galloping" 
type of inflation that monetary inflation sometimes becomes. The inflation 
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of 1958 is an inflation in which unit labor costs have risen out of pro-
portion with the prices that are able to be charged for goods by industry 
and the other productive and distributive sectors of the economy. The 
substantiation for this view of the inflation of 1958 will be found in 
Chapter Seven of this thesis. But, for a quick illustration of what is 
meant by the excessive rise in unit labor costs, reference may be made 
to the chart on the first page of Chapter Seven which is concerned with 
the postwar changes in the average hourly earnings in manufacturing 
industries. 
This condition has arisen under the powerful guise of the 
industry-wide labor contract involving productivity adjustments and 
escalator clauses. The period of this inflation has been characterized 
by an erratic pattern of labor victories in terms of bargaining concessions 
in which industry has been at a severe legal disadvantage. These conditions 
have been aggravated to an even greater extent because the recent period has 
been characterized by rapid inflation and full employment. Labor has had 
the upper hand.* 
Effects of Inflation: 
The Effects of Inflation on the Economy's Total Output: 
Inflation may increase or decrease the nation's total output now 
or in the future, or it may have no eff ect at all. For simplicity, let us 
consider the current effects of inflation as being those which occur within, 
say, the next year or so, and the future effects as being those which show 
*54, 
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up over a longer period. The question arises: Does inflation reduce 
current real output? There is little a priori reason to suppose that 
moderate inflation reduces the size of the current national output. The 
evidence of history is against this claim, except in cases of runaway or 
hyper-, inflation. The common belief that inflation disrupts the economy 
and reduces its total output apparently goes back largely to the massive 
hyperinflations of Central Europe following World War I:* 
At that time the currency became substantially worthless; 
a wheelbarrow full of money was needed to buy one meal; and 
speculative activity became more rewarding than productive work. 
By 1923 in Germany, for example, shortly before the collapse, 
this diversion of energy from normal productive work had become 
a vast drag on the output of real goods and services. 
But in milder inflations history shows output generally rising. 
In the United States since 1937, for example, prices have roughly doubled, 
but the money value of our national output has risen over 400% of 1937. 
Total real output has more than doubled. These historical facts do not 
prove that inflation has not exerted a downward pressure on output. It 
is possible, of course, that other expansive forces have overcome any 
dowmrard pressure that inflation has exerted•** 
It has been claimed that inflation stimulates output and employ-
ment, especially in periods of widespread unemployment. There is no doubt 
that output has generally risen in periods of inflation. But this does 
not necessarily mean that inflation has generally, or even caused the rising 
output, or has even been necessary to it. It should be borne in mind that 
output has also risen in periods of stable, or even slightly declining prices. 
The 19201 s in the United States provide a leading example. Thus, to see 
*55, p 105 
**56, p 103 
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inflation and increased output together by no means automaticallY indicates 
that rising prices are the cause. 
There are two major arguments that inflation reduces future real 
output: (a) the boom-and-bust argument that inflation causes a speculative 
situation that is necessarily followed by a bust and depression;and (b) the 
much longer run argument that inflation discourages saving and thus decreases 
the rate of capital accumulation, which holds down the economy's long-run 
growth rate. 
History both supports the boom-bust argument and contradicts it. 
On the one hand we have seen substantial inflation more or less continuously 
over the past two decades which has been paralleled by a persistent growth 
in real national output. In Brazil inflation averaging over 10% per year 
has continued since the 1930's with rising real output.* On the other hand1 
examples of i nflation-induced collapse do exist. The post~orld War I 
slump of the early 1920's in the United States may be an example. Thus 
rapid inflation may lead to economic collapse, but milder inflation certainly 
may not. 
Concerning the argument that inflation discourages saving and 
retards capital accumulation, its proponents claim that inflation erodes 
the value of accumulated saving and thus encourages current consumption. 
The counter argument to this postulate is that inflation shifts income to 
the rich and to corporate profits and thereby increases saving relative to 
consumption.** In summary, there is no ver.y strong case that inflation of 
modest proportions either increases or decreases substantially the rate of 
*51, p 11 
**58, p 17 
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capital accumulation. Inflation militates against saving in most forms, 
but the motives for saving are many and mixed, and modern society provides 
some effective investment channels such as equity investment opportunities 
to escape the erosion of inflation. 
Outlining the experience of European countries plus the 
United States over the mild inflationary period of 1952 through 1955 
is the exhibit on Inflation, Production, and Employment from 1952 to 1955. 
It shows no consistent relationship at all between inflation and changes 
in production:.;~ 
EXHIBIT - INFLATION, PRODUCTION, AND EMPLOYMENT FROM 1952 to 1955 
(1952 - 100) 
u.s. Be1g. France Germ. Ital. Neth. Swed. Un.Kingdom 
Cost of living: 
1953 101 100 99 98 102 100 101 103 
1954 101 102 99 98 105 104 102 105 
1955 101 101 100 100 108 106 105 110 
Industrial production: 
1953 108 100 97 1~ 110 110 100 106 
1954 100 106 106 122 120 120 104 114 
1955 112 114 114 141 130 128 110 119 
Employment: 
1953 103 99 98 104 100 103 97 101 
1954 100 99 99 1~ 101 107 98 104 
1955 102 101 100 118 103 109 100 107 
(Source: Data h'om J. Hebert FUrth, "Indicators of Inflation in Western 
Europe, 1952-1955, "Review of Economics and Statistics, August 1956, pp.336-337). 
The largest increase in output and employment occurred in West 
Germany, which had no inflation at all; the smallest in Sweden, which had 
an intermediate amount of inflation. Italy, with a slightly smaller price 
increase than Sweden and the United Kingdom, had a much larger increase in 
output than either. The United States and Belgium, with almost no inflation 
i~59, pp 336-337 
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had a bigger increase in output than inflationary Sweden but less than 
non-inflationary Germany and the mildly inflationar,y Netherlands.* 
The Effects of Inflation on the Distribution of Output: 
After examining the effect of moderate inflation on total real 
output we may now ask what effect does inflation have on the relative 
sizes of the different individuals and economic groups sharing in the total 
national income? 
EXHIBIT II: SHARES OF NATIONAL INCOME IN INFLATION, .(1939 - 1956)-H 
120-
110-
100.. 
90-
ao-
70-60---- Consumer Price Index 5o- ____________________________________________ _ 
20-
15-
Unincorporated Business 
Compensation of Employees 
10- Net Interest 
5------- ---------------0- ._.....____ 
39 4o 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 5o 51 52 53 54 55 56 
Since 1939 every broad functional economic group in the United 
States has gained substantially in real income. Within the rapidly growing 
total, however, wages and salaries did not lag behind profits as a share of 
~' Ibid, p 337 
**61, p 107 
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the national income. On the contrary, the wage share grew appreciably over 
the period. 
Inflation transfers wealth (future purchasing power) from creditors 
to debtors. The American inflation has w.i.ped out since 1939 over a half 
a trillion dollars worth of creditor's claims. Households were large net 
creditors in the period 1939 to 1949 and the federal government was the off-
set as the general net debtor. Thus, inflation caused a huge transfer of 
wealth from households to the federal government. But, the real question is: 
to whom did the government distribute these gains?* 
The gainer of the purchasing power confiscated from government 
creditors by inflation is the buying public. The buying public gains as 
a whole in relation to its expenditures. Thus, government bondholders 
and money lenders have been hurt by inflation with their loss being dis-
tributed to the whole population. The biggest benefits go to those who 
buy the most. 
Nature of the Labor Union: 
The fundamental nature of a union lies in the characteristic 
that it is a power organization. Its positive role is to mobilize economic, 
political, and moral power to win objectives for members and leaders.** 
To do so, it will even compete with other unions as is evidenced by recurrent 
jurisdictional disputes, the most hardy perennial, unsolved problem gain 
so that members of another union may benefit, even though its standards 
may already be higher. The auto workers, or steel workers, or printers, for 
~2, p 109 
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example, do not forego making demands for higher wages in order that the 
lower-paid textile workers may catch up to them. 
It is from the perspective of a power system that one can best 
understand the nature and function of trade unions. First, a union is a 
combination of a political and business organization. From the business point 
of view a union is primarilY a marketing agency. Every union is essentially 
a collectivity for selling labor as a unit in the form· of various skills. 
All its other activities are directed to making this selling function as 
effective as possible. From its nature as a power center stems the 
necessity for centralized administration. Since in the final analysis the 
threat of a shutdown determines the price which a corporation will pay for 
labor, a union must be able to initiate and conduct strikes.* 
Management believes that only efficient productive processes will 
give a business real income. Whereas unions feel that workers' interests 
have always been in income and not their output.** 
Views Concerning the Economic Responsibilities of Labor~anagement 
Relations: 
Of all the various points of view concerning the economic re-
sponsibilities in the labor~anagement relation, there are two particular 
views that seem to stand out in opposition to each other. One view is 
that the problem of absorbing increased labor costs is not the responsibility 
of the union. This view point is held by both labor as well as management 
~4, Ibid., p 80 
~5, p 92 
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sectors. The other view is the opposite; name~, that unions should 
assume responsibility for the effects of increased labor costs.* 
Built-In Wage Increases: 
Built-in wage increases inhibit the operation of this country's 
private enterprise econ~. It is contended by businessmen that there is 
no economic justification for these built-in wage boosts that exceed their 
corresponding productivity gains in any particular industry or sector of 
industry. It is contended that they impede the recovery of business and 
the normal functioning of our economic system in the sense that corporations 
and other types of businesses are not able to reduce their prices in a 
recessionary atmosphere to meet the diminished effective demand of the con-
suming public. Businessmen have been doing two things to help eliminate 
some of the vagaries of built-in wage increases such as re-evaluating long-
term contracts with built-in wage increases and asking at the same time 
unions to help eliminate wasteful practices.** 
Although most contracts are for three years, the expiration dates 
on the contracts are staggered so that the automatic increase in one industry 
can create pressure for similar increases in other industries. These actions 
are undertaken by the unions regardless of the prevailing national economic 
picture. This effect derived from staggeredcontract expiration dates has 
caused wages to rise much faster than productivity increases. Many economists 
feel that this has contributed to inflation and has caused the paradox of 
rising prices during the most recent American recession.*** 
~6, p 28 
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A mare detailed discussion of built-in wage increases, the 
escalator clauses, and annual improvement factors will follow in Chapter 
Seven of this thesis with some accompanying statistical data for purposes 
of corroboration. 
Impact of Rising Costs on Smaller Business: 
All of the adverse effects previously mentioned that arise from 
the nature of the labor union do pose serious problems for small businesses. 
This in contrast to the contention that the squeeze on profits can continue 
to be applied in the small business area without serious repercussions. An 
example to bring out the point can be made by citing the case where increasing 
costs, a declining profit, and static prices have caused significant shifts 
within the distributing and wholesaling field in St. Louis. Today, only 
two of the eight original distribution companies remain. These eight 
companies had employed five thousand workers of the Warehouse Distribution 
Wholesalers' Union affiliated with the Teamsters. There were three important 
causes for this economic change in the distribution field in St. Louis: 1) 
poor management 2) direct wage i ncreases unable to be assimilated by the 
industry and 3) expensive fringe benefit costs which kept increasing unit 
labor costs.* 
This wholesaling industry decline was attributed to a lack of 
managerial organization which was unable to stem the tide of aggressive 
unionism. But good management could not have indefinitely withstood the 
onslaught of union demands in terms of direct wage increases and hidden 
fringe-benefit costs. In marginal-profit industries such as this, increased 
labor costs must be offset either by increased productivity or the ability of 
~9, p 92 
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of the business to be able to effectively pass on the increased costs in 
some other way such as increase product differentiation or increased sales 
forces that more than cover the concomitant increase in variable costs 
resulting from their addition to the companies. It must also be remembered 
that many American companies have not the financial resources to invest 
in the labor-saving devices that may be necessitated in order to overcome 
these increasing costs in marginal-profit industries. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CURRENT LABOR-INDUCED WAGE AND PRICE JMBALA.NCES 
Price and Wage Controls: 
If prices continue to rise as they have in the pasttwo years, 
and if monetary and fiscal measures prove ineffective against union drives 
for higher wages, the countr.y may, in desperation, turn to price and wage 
controls. Such controls are useful in a temporary emergency to deal with 
a sudden surge in demand from scarce buying or for limiting the magnitude 
of price inflation during a war. As a solution to the wage inflation 
problem, they are exceedingly dangerous. 
In actual operation, price and wage controls become mainlY price 
controls. Wages escape effective control, and 11cost absorption" - a euphemism 
for the profit squeeze - rollows. This, in turn, leads to all kinds of at-
tempted escapes by business: downgrading of product, introduction of new 
items, and other undesirable practices. Since prices and profits are the 
regulators of business activity, the economy is without effective direction. 
Bureaucracy takes over, attempting to administer the price controls and 
direct the allocation of resources. The economy m~ continue to operate 
for a time more or less satisfactorily if there is adequate demand to take 
the goods off the market and if there is expectation that the price controls 
will be lifted. If, however, price controls continue for long, the economy 
will become increasingly less efficient and increasingly less responsive to 
the needs of the country. The state will take over more and more of the 
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control of the economy, and we shall approximate more and more close~ the 
Russian system. If price controls become permanent, the free-market, 
private-enterprise system is gone, and Socialism or Communism will take 
its place. 
Labor Monopoly Position: 
The power of the unions rests upon the monopo~ control of the 
labor supply and upon various special privileges and immunities, placing 
labor above or, if you prefer, outside the law. These special privileges 
accorded organized labor represent the swing of the pendulum to compensate 
for the weak position of the individual industrial wage earner when confronted 
with the corporate employer. But, the pendulum has swung too far, permitting 
unions to develop enormous monopoly power and allowing them behavior that is 
illegal for ordinary citizens or corporations. Labor unions have moved into 
the position of dominant political power - one that so often assumes for 
itself special privileges, especially in the ear~ states of its ascendancy. 
There has been much resort to the use of illegal means by labor 
unions of compelling management to agree to further concessions. Often 
violence has been turned to in order to enforce labor demands. In order 
to illustrate the point, several examples will be averred to. 
In recognition picketing, the union places its picket line in 
front of the employer1 s premises with the avowed purpose of getting the 
employer to sit down, bargain, and execute a contract immediately. In this 
type of situation the union does not avail itself of the election procedures 
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under the Taft-Hartley Act which would establish whether it represents 
the majority of the employees and thus whether the employer has a legal 
obligation to recognize the union and bargain with it. Instead, the picket 
line is counted on to exert the necessary economic pressure upon the 
employer - without giving employees a chance to decide for themselves 
whether they want a union.* 
Another example of how unions have avoided the law is the one 
where the Taft-Hartley Act was specifically designed (section 8 (b) (6) ) 
to eliminate so-called featherbedding or make-work rules in collective 
bargaining, but it was completely unsuccessful in that regard. Court rulings 
have made it unequivocally clear that the Taft-Hartley Act is no bar to such 
union practices.** The public is gaining greater understanding of these 
and other abuses of the law by labor. In time the public will see that 
they are corrected. 
Market~fide Labor Power: 
The consequences of market-wide labor monopoly are not generally 
understood by the public. But these consequences may in time lead ultimately, 
if not checked, to inflation on a continuing secular basis, possibly in turn 
to price control. The final step in the process if it is carried to its 
logical end might involve the disintegration of the private enterprise system 
that we have done so much to protect over the years. 
The monopoly power of labor unions is not likely to be exercised 
with restraint or discretion because of the traditions of militant, organized 
labor - always striving for higher and higher wages. In order to elaborate 
*70, p 362 
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further on this point, the reader is reminded of the development in Chapter 
Five of this thesis of the tendency of labor unions towards centralization. 
From its nature as a power center (described in Chapter Five) stems the 
necessity of unions for centralized administration. The strike enables the 
union to carry out its threats. But, a well-organized strike is essentially 
an exercise in military strategy and tactics calling for highly centralized 
decision making. For example, it was his qualities as a military strategist 
that made John L. Lewis the natural leader of the CIO in its earlY days.* 
Some have said that it is the responsibility of labor to contain 
the demands of labor. This will not be possible unless the excessive powEr 
of labor is reduced. The most desirable solution to the labor monopoly 
problem and wage inflation will be found in the development of anti~onopolY 
laws comparable to those that govern business. The development of the 
position of this thesis on the subject of the needed changes in anti-monopoly 
laws to cover labor is undertaken in detail through Chapter Eight of this 
thesis. Such a development would be out of place here since it will not be 
until Chapter Seven that the statistical corroboration for these contentions 
is given. 
Danger of Inflation: 
To keep the problem of inflation in perspective, one should bear 
in mind that in the years ahead there will be great pressures on world 
resources. Nations presently industrialized hasten to catch up. In the 
United States, we face a period of rapid population growth, greatly expanded 
*72, p 80 
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markets and for the next several years, a relative shortage of labor in 
proportion to the size of the total population. The burden of continued 
high levels of defense spending appears inescapable for the United States 
and for many other nations of the world. 
The second danger to be stressed is the danger that people might 
come to regard inflation as a comforting friend rather than a deadly foe. 
If chronic inflation were ever to become, stated or otherwise, the national 
policy, the consequences would be grave indeed. Think for a moment what 
might happen to saving habits, interest rates, business contracts, and the 
cost of carrying the national debt if the United States were to put the 
world on notice that it no longer regarded its currency as a stable unit of 
accounts, no longer respected it as a standard of deferred payments, no 
longer prized it as a store of value, but intended only that it be nothing 
more than a script for use as a current medium of exchange. It would mean 
the destruction of faith in the fairness and integrity of our institutions 
and the beginning of the end for our present way of life. 
Inflation is only one of the evils to which the growth of union 
power has contributed. Union power has contributed to inflation in the 
sense that it has enabled labor leaders to derive through the bargaining 
process wage and fringe benefit increases that have increased unit labor 
costs out of proportion with changes that have taken place in the productivity 
of the workers involved. This means that in order to maintain existing 
profit levels, businessmen will have to pass on the increases in unit labor 
costs beyond productivity increases to the consuming public in the form of 
higher prices. The discussion of the raation of labor costs to pr~ductivity 
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changes will be continued at another point in this chapter and also in 
detail from the statistical point of view in Chapter Seven. 
Union power has also contributed to the inflation in the sense 
that union power today includes monopoly power over entry into many fields 
of work. Through the device of the union shop, unions are permitted by 
the law to extract what amounts to tribute from involuntary members who 
must sign up in order to earn their daily bread. In some areas, unions 
have shown that they can commit acts of violence with impunity, to win 
through fear what cannot be won through right. Unions have acquired enormous 
economic power, subject to little regulation. Unions also have great 
political power resulting not so much from their ability to deliver their 
members' votes, as from their huge financial rescources and the development 
of large staffs which are trained in political action. 
There are increasing efforts by certain union leaders to take over 
the management of the companies they are negotiating and distributing 
industry, cited in the previous chapter, the author, Karches, of the article 
from which the reference was taken has mentioned that union leaders attempted 
to dictate what prices ought to be charged and how profits should be utilized 
in order to give the union members adequate wages.* The result of this 
union interference was that six of the eight original wholesaling and distri-
buting companies located in the St. Louis area went out of business by reason 
of the excessive union pressure. 
Rank and File Control: 
Concomitant with the growth of union power and the shift in 
emphasis from economic bargaining to political manuvering has come a third 
59 
development. This has been the loss of control of unions by the rank 
and file.,c It bas been said tl¥lt the union shop and the closed shop -
in other words, compulsory unionism - have been mainly responai.ble for 
the loss of control by the rank and file of their own unions. When men 
are not free to draw their union membership and financial support without 
givirig up their livelihood, their leaders feel little need to be re-· 
sponaive to their wi.shes. They can act, if they wish, without regard 
for democratic proce~ures and employ their power for purposes unrelated 
to the interests of their membership. 
The point is that the positions of unions under our l.aws 
invites the misuse of power in a manner that offers little or no re-
course to the injured. Such a position opens the way to exploitation 
of union members by unworthy union officials. It attraots- ~•e who 
seek to screen their racketeering behind the ~cial privileges granted 
unions. It sometimes leads to the frustration of constitu~ rights 
of iJ)dividuals and the denial of democratic processes within the unions. 
For such reasons as these, macy individuals and groups such 
as The National Industrial Conference Board, the Committee for, Econ011dc -
Development in part, Senator McClellan and other prominent outspoken 
notables Wbo do not have any personal vested interests to maintain from 
the management point of viev, have concluded that the time bas. now come 
to withdraw some of the special privileges enjoyed by unions and to 
establish a legal framework which vUl unions more accountable to 
their members and the public welfare. 
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Senator Karl Mundt recently expressed this thought in these 
words: 
"We want legislation which is not punitive in design and 
which is not conceived to punish people. But we need legislation 
which I am confident the rank and file of labor will enthusiastically 
support along with the responsible leaders of labor, and which will 
restore the balance of power between the dues-paying member and his 
labor leaders and between the employer and the employee as equal~ 
important segments of our great and growing industrial econotey"." 
Overproduction Theory: 
A business man commonly makes two mistakes. First, he aver-
estimates the duration and permanence of the demand of consumers and 
producers for consumers• and producers• goods and for services. Second, 
he over-estimates the share of the total narket .:which his firm will enjoy. 
At present, some individual fir.ms do better than their manage-
ments had expected. In the flowing tides of business, some go farther 
and faster than others. But as prosperity rises towards the peak, some 
firma find that consumers resist further price increases, and they find 
that at the going prices, buyers are reluctant. Meanwhile, managements 
have undertaken great programs of expansion to take care of the needs of 
an expanding economy, which they are sure will continue to expaDi. 
Even when increased productive capacity is ringing forth 
greater output, and saturation of the market at present prices appears, 
they still go on expanding, and they lay out on paper even further en-
largements. Then comes the time when even the most stubbornly optimistic 
realize that they have gone too far. Products come onto the markets 
o~ to be left there b,y reluctant buyers. Every possible explanation 
is given except the right one. The blame is laid variously on inadequate 
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credit, Federal Reserve policy, lack of dynamic salesmanship, government 
policy in this, tba t or the other realm, high interest rates. The actual 
trouble lies in producing more goods than people want to buy at prices 
that are asked.* 
People often speak of overproduction. This is inaccurate. 
But overproduction at going prices is accurate. In other words, business-
men produce at a price far more than people want to buy at that price. 
They have incurred maizy costs which compel them to charge that price or 
suffer loss, perhaps bankruptcy. But that is precisely the problem. 
They have drawn more resources of labor and capital into production at 
higher costs than the uarket justifies, and when all of them do it to-
gether, they realize unanimously that the mistake has been made. 
High Price Expansion: 
What kind of responsibility do businessmen have when they go 
recklesscy on paying high prices for mre capacity, when what they have 
is more than adequate, and conswners are showing reluctance to spend 
enough to take off the supplies coming onto the market? It may be said 
that a great part of the new investment is not for expansion, but for 
cutting costs by installing labor-saving devices. True, but the new 
machinery bas to be paid for. If the consumers don't want to pay for 
it by bu;ying the goods, the labor-saving devices become expensive indeed. 
However well-intentioned, a firm heading towards bankruptcy is still 
heading for bankruptcy. And if bankruptcy is not the final result, 
impaired financial strength will be the lot for many companies now 
looked upon as being as solid as a rock. It is a well known .f'act that 
*75, p 3 
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the liquidity of industrial firms as a whole is being more and more 
impaired. Is it unreasonable to ask this question: Is it not possible 
that this period is witnessing the greatest irresponsibility of business 
leaders in our history?* 
But this is not the only score against them. The kim of 
conduct that is now going on is the kind that intensifies seriously the 
business cycle of boom and bust. For a period of time business men 
cannot get enough resources and labor and they bid up the prices and wages, 
in the mistaken notion that they must do everything now. Nothing can wait. 
Then when they discover simultaneously that they have all overdone it, 
disaster strikes. They have encouraged labor to work for high wages, 
and working men ever,ywhere have gone into debt themselves in the antici-
pation of similar wage returns in the future. Demam slacks off and 
overtime is reduced or eliminated. Then four days rather than five are 
worked, and maybe three. For some there is unemployment. One week 1 s 
reduced pay check may be embarrassing. Three weeks of missed pay checks 
for some are disastrous. If this becomes general, depression settles 
on the land, as repossessed goods add to the over production of new ones. 
Disagreeable as depression is, with all its distress and heartbreak, it 
is the way by which adjustments are made, as malallocated capital is 
corrected, labor is shifted from where it is not wanted to where it can 
be used, and costs and prices are brought down and brought into new 
alignments. And businessmen are contributing measurably to this situation 
by their irresponsibility.** 
*16, Ibid., p 21 
**11, Ibid., p 21 
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Labor Irresponsibility: 
However, businessmen •s irresponsibility is natChed by- that 
of labor union leaders. Managements have typically yielded to unions 
and passed the increases on to the public. Escalator clauses and 
automatic wage increases aggravate the situation. So do productivity 
increases. Productivity increases aggravate the wage-price spiral in 
the sense that the wage increases that are granted to labor on the basis 
of the increase in the productivity of workers more than equ.al the in· 
crease in the productivity level of the workers. However, the wage 
concessions that have been accruing to labor in general since 1955 have 
been far in excess of the levels of increased productivity. This point 
will be statistically dESllonstrated in the following chapter. 
Productivity Increases: 
Concerning productivity increases, there is one point of con-
tention that needs to be clarified. That point is the one where it is 
held that business leaders are surrendering in the bargaining process 
what they have actually no right to give up. "What is meant by this 
statement is that all of the factors of production should be rewarded for 
the increases that are derived by the company in relation to productivity. 
Should not the possessors of land and capital have some Share in increases 
in the productivity levels? It is not to be denied by any manner or means 
that labor truly plays the most important role in effecting these pro-
ductivity gains. But it is in the same breath not too remiss to mention 
that, however large, the owners of business enterprise should share in 
some way be rewarded for their participation in a business venture's 
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productivity gains. It is not intended here by any means that labor 
should ever be neglected at any time in the process of distributing 
the gains from productivity increases. 
Uneven Distribution Among Laborers: 
Moreover, the benefits accruing to labor are unevenly dis-
tributed among the working men, regardless of whether they come in the 
form of automatic pay increases, escalator clauses, or productivity 
increases. These things have to be paid for, am the ones that get the 
most must get it from others. Those who get none of these things bear 
the most burdens, such as those on pensions and other fixed incomes, but 
not so well off as those whose economic power is greatest. However, 
there is another reaoon why handing over all of a productivity increase 
to labor in a sense creates i'urther imbalance. For, a productivity in-
crease brings an advantage to the group that enjoys an increase in pro-
ductivity, but that advantage is likely to be only temporary. No firm 
has a monopoly on brains, and as soon as someone finds a way to increase 
efficiency, another in another company comes up with an even better idea. 
CoJrpetition enters the picture, and the prices of the products fall, or 
if prices are rising, they rise less rapidly. Actually, productivity 
sometimes gets back to the consumer. Even administered prices are subject 
to coJrpetition, though they are not as flexible as non-administered prices. 
Administered prices JIIU.St show flexibility in time, and productivity helps 
to bring about this flexiblli ty. * 
*78, Ibid.' p 3~ 
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Inflation Is Not Inevitable: 
It is a mistake to conclude that because or escalator clauses, 
automatic increases, and productivity increases, which simply must be 
paid for by the conswoor, that we are in for steadily mounting inflation. 
We may be in for that, but not necessarily so. There is good reason 
for thinking we w.ill not suffer this way, but oncy under one assumption, 
namely, that the amount of money in circulation, including bank deposits, 
does not increase substantially. This assumption is valid now. The 
amount of purchasing power is not increasing very much now, nor is the 
velocity of circulation increasing substantially. Then, if this holds, 
the rise in prices will level off, and perhaps cease. Perhaps declining 
prices will be observed. Here is the reason: As the price level rises, 
Jll8.1'zy' find their income increasing faster than the price level, because 
of these productivity, automatic and escalator increases. They are 
better off. Those whose incomes increase in proportion are holding their 
own. But there are people who find that ~ir incomes do not increase 
as mch as the price level rises, or do not increase at all. They are 
forced piecemeal out of the market. As this process goes on, more 
people find they cannot buy what they want. And finally, this brings the 
price-wage ~iral to a halt. 
As wage earners will not take a decrease in wage rates, they 
are forced to take it in the form of decreased pay for fewer hours 
worked, and some find complete unemployment. So the gains of labor turn 
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out to be unemployment, bitterness, distress, and a conviction that the 
capitalistic system has broken down. It has not broken down. It has 
simply tried to correct the excesses, and left alone, it will do it. 
The econom;y will expand when goods and services that people want are 
offered at prices people can afford to pay, or want to pay, and when 
businessmen an1 labor leaders forget this, they are inviting trouble. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
LABJR COST AND PROOOCTIVITY RELATIONSHIPS 
Average hourly earnings in manufacturing industries have 
risen spectacularly from $1.02 in 1945 to $2.08 in October 1957. This 
increase of more than one dolBr an hour or the doubling of the total in 
a twelve-year period is one of the most sensational increases in our 
-
histor,y.* The casual forces in the 1955-1957 price rise have been subject 
to wide dispute. m.ame has been placed on government spending, industrial 
price policy, high profits, increased velocity of credit, excessive wage 
increases, and the business boom. Because of the rise in prices, real 
wages have risen much less than money wages. From 1945 to 1957, real 
average hourly earnings in manufacturing rose by 29.6% as conpared with 
the rise of 103.9% in money earnings during the same period.** 
AVERAGE HOURLY EARNINGS IN MANUFACTURING INWSTRIES 
Average Hourly Consumer Real Average 
Earnings Price Index Hourly Earnings 
~in 19~7-49 Dollars) 
1945 $1.02 76.9 $1.326 
October 1957 2.08 121.1 1.718 
Per Cent Change 103.9% 51.5% 29.6% 
This is a major gain in real earnings which has been suppleJOOnted by other 
significant benefits. However, it is much less sensational than the gains 
which emerge when money incomes alone are considered. The role played by 
the rise in labor costs in creating pressures for price rises will be 
considered after reviewing the magnitude of the gains in other labor benefits. 
*19, p 15 
*lf8o, Ibid. ,. l5 
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Fringe Benefits: 
During the postwar period, some types of benefit payments have 
been liberalized significantly while others have been introduced on a wide 
scale for the first time. The following is a terse description of some of 
the more important changes in these benefits. 
At the end of the war a minority of companies gave their pro-
duction workers paid holidays. In 1947 many conpmies agreed to grant 
six paid holidays although some companies did give a larger number. By 
1957 the typical contract provided for seven or more paid holidays.** In 
terms of vacations 1945 was a year which saw one week vacation for one 
year of service and two weeks for five years. A minority of companies pro-
vided three-1or-eek vacations usually after fifteen of service. By 1957 the 
service requirements for two-week vacations were fewer than five years in 
a growing majority of contracts. A third week of vacation was added in 
most industries with a service requirement of ten to fifteen years. In 
some contracts a fourth week of vacation is now being granted, usually 
after twenty-five years of service.** 
Some companies produced pension plans during World war II. But 
the big impetus came in 1949. They have been expanded substantially since 
then. Most plans are no longer integrated with social security. A larger 
number of workers are now being covered while at the same time the benefits 
have been substantially liberalized. The costs to the companies have, thus, 
increased steadily.*** 
-while pension funds have been increasing steadily, there has 
been a large growth in health and welfare plans with an increase in the 
-*Bl, p 57-286 
**B2, Ibid. , p 91-3 
*1Hf83, p 4 
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number of workers being covered. At the same time there has resulted 
improvements in benefits paid, greater life insurance, and a larger 
coverage of dependents. The cost of these plans has concomitantly risen. 
According to the United States Department of Commerce estimates, emplo,yer 1s 
contributions to pension and welfare fUnds rose t.rom $1.1 billion in 1945 
to $3.6 billion in 1951 and $5.7 billion in 1956.* Also, there bas been 
an increase in premium pay for holidays and the introduction of premium 
pay for Saturday and SUnday work in continuous-process industries like 
steel to add to the increasing number of fringe benefits that have accrued 
to labor in general since the end of the war. 
In order to point out the relative importance of the comparative 
costs of fringe benefits, a comprehensive survey b.r the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce will be cited. The last full study undertaken, however, was for 
the year 1955 when the average fringe payment for leading companies was 
estimated to be 20.3 per cent of the payroll or 39.2 cents per payroll hour.** 
Legally required payments (employer 1 s share only of 
social security, workmen's compensation and unemploy-
ment compensation) 
Pension, Welfare funds, etc. 
Paid rest periods, lunch periods, etc. 
Payments for time not worked (holidays, vacation, 
sick leave, etc. 
Profit-sharing payments, houses, etc. 
Total 
3.6% 
6.3 
2.2 
6.3 
1.9 
20.3% 
In 1955 the survey, the Chamber of Commerce covered the experience 
of one thousand companies. Varying numbers of companies did report in the 
five surveys conducted b.r the Chamber of Co:rmnerce since 1947. 
il-84, Ibid., p 4 
-H-85, p 10 
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However, a group of 79 manufacturing companies provided data for each of the 
five surveys. The following chart is a compilation of the fringe costs for 
the aforementioned companies. 
FRINGE-COST CHANGES FOR THE 79 SURVEYED COMPANIES* 
Year 
1947 
1949 
1951 
1953 
1955 
Cent per 
P~oll Hour 
18.4 
23.8 
30.9 
37.1 
44.8 
Per Cent 
of Pal!oll 
12.9 
14.9 
16.9 
18.5 
20.4 
Clearly, the cost of fringe benefits has risen significantly for these 
leading companies since 194 7 - and the rise would be still greater if data 
were available for 1945 and 1957. During the 1947-1955 period, the cost 
of fringes rose by 143.5% while the average hourly earnings of these 
seventy-nine companies rose from $1.43 to $2.20 or by 53.8%. Fringe costs 
have been increasing at a much more rapid rate than wages. From 194 7 to 
1955 added fringe costs of 26.4 cents per hour were more than one third as 
large as the seventy-seven-cent increase in average hourly earnings.** 
The United States Department of Commerce has estimated that total 
supplements to wages and salaries have increased from 1.9 billion dollars in 
1939 to five billion dollars in 1945, 5.4 billion in 1947 and 12.4 billion 
in 1956•***From 1945 to 1956 the cost of these supplements rose about one 
hundred and fifty per cent. These data point out that the cost of f ringes 
is no mean consideration and t hat they must be heavily considered in con-
junction with wages if a true labor-cost picture is to be developed. 
-*86, Ibid. , p 10 
**B7~ Ibid., p 29-31 
iHHt-Sts, p 22 
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Increases in Labor Costs versus Productivity Gains -
The key to the impact of labor eosts upon prices is found in 
labor cost-productivity relationships. Labor cost increases press upon 
unit Costs and prices when they xceed the ge,ins in productivity. It 
should be emphasized in making these comparisons that all labor costs 
must be considered, not wages alone. When the Coste of wages and other 
benefits increases more than output per manhour, unit labor costs rise. 
No amount of statistical manipulation can change this fact. 
Productivity data prepared by ·the u. s. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
usually are obtained by relating production workers hours paid f or to the 
total output. lhis method .of measurement overstates the rise in product-
ivity in recent years. Productivity reflects the result of all .. hours 
worked by all workers in a. compa.ey or an industry. Ylhen there was little 
change in the proportion of production workers in a compaqy, no serious 
errors arose if productivity was measured in terms of their manhours 
alone. The trend overtime, which is the important figure, was not dis-
torted. However, in recent years the proportion of of production workers 
in our economy has declined. For. example, from 1947 to 1956, the ratio 
of production workers to the total decreased from 83.7% to 78.0%. 
The relative increase in the number of nonproduction workers over the 
past decade has resulted from the increase in such nonproduction act-
ivities as engineering, science, sales and personnel.* 
With these limitations in mind, let us examine the changes in 
wages and productivity for manufacturing industries during the war and 
postwar period. Increases in wages have exceeded by a very wide margin 
the increases in productivity in all manufacturing industries and for the 
il89, pp 43 5-440 
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entire economy. Average hourly earnings in manufacturing industries 
rose by 214% from 1939 to 1956. Inclusive of various fringe benefits, 
the increase is even larger. During the same period, output per man-
hour rose 2. 7% in all manufacturing industries in 1956 as compared with 
the rise of 5.3% in average hourly earnings exclusive of fringe benefits. 
Unit labor costs rose 2.9%. For the entire private nonagricultural 
econo~, productivity recorded no change in 1956 and unit labor costs 
rose 4.5%. * 
The increase in wages in excess of the gains in productivity with 
the accompanying rise in unit labor costs has been called wage inflation. 
Sometimes, the pressure for price rises resulting from excessive increases 
in labor costs is described as a cost-push inflation in contrast to the 
demand-pull inflation which results from an excessive creation of money 
supply. 
The impact on prices of such increases in unit labor costs depends 
in part on their relative importance. Thus, where labor costs account for 
a small percentage of total revenues, the effect on prices of any rise in 
such labor costs will be small. Where labor costs are a large percentage, 
the price effects tend to be significant. Services are predominantly 
labor costs and this is an area of the economy where productivity gains 
have been minimal. Thus, it is not surprising to find that the steady 
rise in wages and other labor costs has been reflected in a steady rise 
in the prices of all types of services. Between March 1955 and October 
1957, the prices of services rose 7.9% as compared with the rise of 4.9% 
in the retail prices of goods. Between 1951 and October 1957, the prices 
if9(), p 4 
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of Services have risen 22.0% while goods prices rose only 3.6%. 
Between 1949 and October 1957, the increases have been 32.4% for 
services and 13.6% for goods.* It seems evident, therefore, that 
wage inflation has contributed significantly to the rise in the con-
sumer price index in recent years. 
The .Annual ~roveroent Factor: 
In 1948, General Motors Corporation introduced the annual improve-
ment factor into collective bargaining. This was an attempt to relate 
.formally the improvements in real wages to gains in productivity in the 
national econoii\Y. However, the annual improvement factor principle has 
never been adhered to very closely since the labor costs have increased 
substantially more than productivity. Initia~, General Motors announced 
that because the long term gain in national productivity was 2% a year, 
it bad to an increase of 3 cents an hour or 2% in the real wages of its 
employees. Since the first contract, the wage increase provided has been 
stepped up to 2-1/2% or 6 cents an hour, whichever is greater.** 
The Escalator Clause: 
To protect workers against a rise in living costs, a number of 
contracts include wage escalator clauses. The Bureau of Labor statistics 
reports that about 3-1/2 million union workers are now protected by these 
clauses. The number of employees doubled between Januar,y 1955 and 
December 1956. Included in this category are railroad workers, steel 
workers, auto workers, meat packers, and many others. These clauses 
typically provide that, every three months or six months, workers shall 
i€91, p 29 
**92, Ibid.' p 29 
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have their wages adjusted to changes in the consumer price index in 
accordance with a prescribed ratio.* 
Let us see the effects of wage escalation. When prices rise, 
wages follow a short time later. Such wage increases have the same 
ilrpact on costs as any other wage increases. There is nothing about 
their timing to suggest that productivity will have risen at the same 
time. In fact, the larger the price rise, the less likely it is that 
wage increases will bear arr:r relationship to productivity changes. One 
result is a further rise in unit labor costs. 
The rise in unit labor costs creates pressure on total unit costs 
and in turn upon prices. If prices are increased gener~, the con-
sumer price index rises and a new ro'W¥i of wage increases automa.ti~ 
takes place. It seems obvious that wage escalation clauses adopted as 
a protection against increases in the cost of living help to bring about 
the price increases which they are supposed to neutralize. Escalator 
clauses help to widen the gap between increases in labor costs and in 
productivity and hence add to the pressure for higher prices. 
Long Tenn Contracts: 
One of the important developments in labor relations in recent 
years has been the negotiation of long term contracts. In many industries, 
three year contracts have been introduced. Among the industries with 
such contracts are: steel, railroads, automobiles, electrical equipment, 
and alwn:inum. About 5,000,000 workers are covered under long term contracts.** 
*93, p 52 
H94, Ibid., p 50 
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Long term labor contracts provide an element of stability 
in the terms of the labor bargain. It seems desirable to provide such 
stability for all elements in the labor contract except wage rates. 
When predetermined wage increases are included as part of these contracts, 
then we find companies required to give wage increases of a size that 
would not be ~anted in light of the actual economic conditions prevailing 
at the time of the increase. 
The following table shows the change in real average hourly 
earnings :ball manufacturing industries since the end of World War n. 
Year 
-
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 (9 months) 
Real Hourly Earnings 
(In 1947-49 Dollars) 
$1.31 
1.30 
1.31 
1.38 
1.43 
1.43 
1.47 
1.55 
1.58 
1.64 
1.70 
1.72 
Year to Year 
Change 
-c.8 
..0.8 
+5.3 
+3.6 
+--.. 
+2.8 
+5.4 
+1.9 
+3.8 
+3.7 
+1.2 
lhe rise in real hourly earnings in 1949 was 5.3%. With 
the exception of 1953, it was the largest rise in the entire postwar 
period. , Increases in wage rates and other labor costs during periods 
of recession act to limit the downward price adjustments which can play 
so significant a role in correcting the economic maladjustments of the 
preceding boom. Such declines in prices also provide some urgent relief 
to the fixed income groups who fail to share in the boom and who are 
penalized by the rise in prices at such times.* 
*95, op.cit., p 30 
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The timing of long term contracts in different industries also 
plays a significant role in the wage inflation picture. The relation-
ship between auto workers and steel workers contracts i s particularly 
important because of the intense :rivalry between Walter Reuther and 
David MacDonald. Thus, for example, the three years contract entered 
into by the automobile industry in 1955 was a very important determinant 
of the level of wage and fringe increases agreed upon in the steel industry ' s 
three year contract negotiated in 1956.* 
Thus, one of the unfortunate attributes of long term contracts 
with predetermined wage increases and overlapping contract periods, is 
that they tend to prevent even a one year breathing spell in the march 
upward of wage and labor cost increases at rates exceeding the long term 
gains in productivity. Under these conditions, long term contracts add 
to the pressures on prices which are generated by wage inflation. 
Wage Changes and the Trend of Economic Activity: 
During periods of expansion, it is probable that the rise in 
unit labor costs will lead to a rise in prices and possib~ to some 
mading of the margin of profits. This is what happened during the 1955-51 
boom. 
During a periodcC stable or declinjng business activity, it 
will be more difficult, and in many instances impossible, to pass on a 
rise in unit labor costs in e form of higher prices. Rather, the 
tendency would be to reduce profit margins and/ or to cut costs with the 
«96, p 43 
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resulting increase in unemployment. During the period of boom, when 
price increases follow labor cost increases, it is often said that the 
labor cost increase caused the price increase. But if insufficient 
demand did not result in a higher level of prices, a company would not 
be in a position to recoup its higher labor cost through this means. In 
effect, the higher labor costs become the excuse, the publicly accepted 
rationale, for the price increase which is possible because of the 
strength of demand. In the light of the political concern over price 
rises, however, it may be questioned whether prices would rise as Dllch 
in the absence of large increases in unit labor costs. Hence, in this 
sense, we may speak of a wage-price spiral when wage increases in excess 
of productivity gains create a wage inflation which becomes the reason 
for the rise in prices. 
CHAPTER KIGHT 
CONCLUSION: LEGISlATIVE ADJUmmM AND 
APPRAISAL TO REOOCE THE DANGER OF SECULAR WAGE INFLATION 
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In the short run the purchasing power of currencies has 
typicaJ.l;y fluctuated with movements of the business cycle , not as a cause 
but as an effect. These price movements have been consistent with a 
progressive growth in real per capita income. Business fluctuations, 
and the short run fluctuations in the purchasing power of the currency 
unit, were accepted in the past as natural phenomena, arising out of the 
vagaries of human nature. It was not expected, though, that these 
fluctuations would ever at any time be abolished. 
typically it has been thought that prosperit,y breeds crises 
and depressions. The slow accumulation of stresses in our dynamic 
econouzy- had and has been thought to gain momentum as prosperity brings 
about a gradual rise in the cost of doing business which reflects and 
is reflected in a rise in prices of goods and services; of the continued 
use of less efficient plants, equipment and labor; of the increased 
business tolerance of waste; and of the developing tension or tightness 
in the money and capital markets. Eventually, these stresses and strains 
reach the breaking point of the weaker members of the business arena and 
their difficulties become gradually communicated to the rest of the 
econonzy-. But, over time the process is reversed. There are reductions 
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in the cost of doing business, in prices and in wages; the efficiency 
of management and labor increases as profits and jobs become more scarce. 
Eventually profits would begin to rise and pessimism would again give 
way to optimism. 
But, at present the tale is somewhat different. Now, there 
is reason to believe that a better job than this early SUII'JIIBry of business 
cycle behavior can be accomplished. Certain shcok absorbers have been 
developed in our econo~ which by placing the strain of periodic adjust-
ments partly on the whole community instead of alJoost wholly on one 
particular area, have eased the strain of these adjustments. There has 
been a change in attitude toward capital investment in comparison to 
that which prevailed in the past. In the past the uneven rate of new 
investment was a principal cause of economic fluctuations. Investment 
projects for the expansion of capacity and the utilization of new equipment 
and techlliques showed a decided bunching tendency. In recent years, how-
ever, business men more and more appear to have had their sights fL"'{ed 
on the long-term growth of the econo:rtzy' rather than on the short-term swings. 
It bas become IOOre and more accepted that the maintenance of a competitive 
position requires continuing research and a continuing high rate of 
capital investment.* 
The great mass of consumers, too, with the knowledge of the 
provisions that have been made for temporary easing of individual economic 
distress, should not be so directed b.1 apprehensions of the future as they 
have been in the past. Although consumer behavior is the least predictable 
-l$7' p 27 
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of economic forces, some relance can be placed on the insistent desire 
of our people for better living as a contribution to the avoidance of 
severe and extended economic adjustments. 
Acceptance of the belief of the inevitability of inflation, 
may be the right prescription for the more agile members of the com-
munity for awhile, but if we all become inflationists, there will be 
no one to pay the piper, and the dance will be over. Everybody, or 
almost everyboQy is already trying directly or indirectly to hedge 
against inflation. It is easy to see that if everybody could protect 
themselves from inflation by these or other devices, we would really 
have changed nothing by debasing our money, except as our international 
position was compromised. The financially nimble and the organized 
power groups can disregard this possibility, only because it is likely 
that a considerable part of the population - the economical~ weak -
never will be able to protect itself completely from the hazards of in-. 
flation. This would not seem to be the most desirable situation to em-
brace openly and officially by either political or economic leaders. 
More insidious in our economic climate is the idea that a little 
bit of inflation - a decline in the purchasing power of the dollar of 
about 2 or 3% a year - can be taken regularly without harm. It is assumed 
by the advocates of creeping inflation that without "more or less con-
tinuous homeopathic doses of inflation we cannot have more or less con-
tinuous high levels of production and employment, 11* which general policy 
~8, Ibid., p 30 
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is now more or less the main guide of economic policy. This is an 
assumption which has yet to have been proven. It would not necessitate 
the use of monetary policy to try to cover up the defects of other 
parts of our econonti.c program. Those who seek to promote maximum pro-
duction and employment b.Y creeping inflation, induced or aided b.1 
credit policy, are trying to correct structural maladjustments cy de-
basing the savings of the people and undermining the system of democratic 
Capitalism which we have done so much to develop. 
But aside from this exposition of general objectives concerning 
inflation there are other more tangible considerations to be examined for 
the purpose of shedding further light on the general direction of this 
specific thesis. From this point on an attempt will be made to draw this 
thesis to its conclusion. 
The growth of nationwide trade unions has introduced elements 
of monopoly in many of our labor markets. It has also fostered active 
rivalry among trade union leaders in pressing for higher wages and more 
liberal fringe benefits. Employers have often been willing to concede 
what is demanded by trade unions, partly because of a feeling of helplessness, 
partly because of the comforting thought that their competitors would have 
to foot the same bill, and partly because they m.ve reckoned that any 
increase in labor costs per unit of output could be passed on to their 
customers. 
B\lsiness monopoly is prohibited b.Y law, and the enforcement 
of our anti-trust laws has of late been very vigorous. Trade unions, 
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however, enjoy imrmmities under the law that are denied other groups 
of individuals. OUr anti-trust laws need strengthening in their ap-
plication to the business world, as the President and many leaders in 
Congress have repeatedly- pointed out. The least we can do with regard 
to trade unions is to subject their finances, as well as the election 
of their officials, to standards defined by law.* Such legislation would 
of itself have no effect on what happens at the bargaining table. 
Despite the distinct improvement in our labor laws and the 
court 1 s construction of them in recent years, management, by and large, 
tends to view the labor f'uture with some misgivings. The Taft-Hartley 
Law represented a solid step toward a more balanced and nature national 
labor policy when it was superimposed on the Wagner Act, and recent NLRB 
and court decisions have overturned important earlier rulings that 
business had found it hard to live with. Examples of these concerned 
such key questions as the "hot cargo" clause, minority union picketing, 
employers 1 right to lock out defensively against a union 1 s "divide and 
conquer' tactics, and employer free speech.** 
Labor unions are not touched by our anti-trust laws, except 
where unions and eiJi>loyers jointly engage in monopolistic activity. 
Jl)nployers have argued in vain that modern organized labor has the power 
to shut down whole industries and impose conditions that influence pricing. 
Unions, in this view, are in as good a position to act "in restraint of 
trade" as are employers. 
*99, p 84 
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Parallelism does not necessarily lnean causation, but it may 
furnish a clue. The tremendous growth o.f monolithic labor union 
monopolies in the United States is the characteristic peculiar to the 
1955-ot'&mrd inflation that did not apply to other past inflations so 
specifically. 't-blt lies at the root of lhe present inflationary treat 
is that there has resulted in the last fifteen or twer~ty years tremendous 
institutional changes that have measurably altered the position of labor 
and the farmers as well . Under labor and farm legislation, people have 
been classified ~ occupation and accordingly have been given certain 
kinds of privileges. 
The rivalry of labor leaders, operating within the framework 
of our legislation and social attitudes, requires them o use or threaten 
to use their destructive power to bring about big increases, year by 
year, in the basic, underlying costs of all industrial production. These 
increases must find reflection in prices or unemployment- Un:ier our 
present institutional set-up there may be cited three possible alterna• 
tives that our nation will be confronted with in the ensuing years 
concerning inflationary tendencies : 
a. Depreciation in the purch sing power of the dollar 
b. Increasing levels of unemployment, or 
c . If the above two arc to be avoided, the abuses of 
labor monopoly power 'Will have to be curbed . * 
In the development of the thought of this thesis it would not 
be too far amiss to consider at this time several limitations that must 
be kept in mind in dral'ring conclusions about these labor- m:m.agement 
*101, p 48 
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relations and their consequences that we have been discussing. In the 
first place when considering a particular factor like the rise in wages 
it is sometimes difficult to distinguish whether the factor being con-
sidered is an autonomous factor, an original factor or whether it is a 
consequence of something that preceded it. Our understanding of these 
matters is .further complicated by the facts that there are oftentimes 
lags between cause and effect in economics. 
Secondly, assuming a particular factor is called autonomous, 
the problem always seems to arise that other factors enter into the 
situation in tracing the consequences of the autonomous factor. Thirdly, 
statistics, no matter how detailed and elaborate, are never really quite 
good enough for the purposes for which they were originally derived. 
An example of this third limitation may be borne out by an examination 
of the validity of fringe-benefit-cost compilations in comparison to the 
much more reliable data that is available concerning wage costs.* 
Union Monopoly Power may be defined as the power that accrues 
to unions in 'Which the threat of strike action enables the union to dictate 
the wage bargain, the consequence of lrilich pushes wages far beyond reason-
able levels of productivity. A fair wage has been understood to mean 
that wage which the employer has been willing to pay and which the employee, 
through his union, has been willing to agree to.** The question arises 
as to whether collective bargaining can be adapted to meet the current 
danger of inflation. 
The issue of union security or compulsory union membership, 
which seems to be involved in the complaint of union monopoly power, 
*102, p 57 
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has so many implications as to defy simple analysis. Government policy 
on the issue has changed radically in the past twenty years. Since the 
Taft-Hartley Act, the Maximum form of compulsion permitted under a union 
security agreement is the payment of an amount equal to the union's 
initiation fees and dues. 
In the mass-production industries particularly, management 
formerly resisted union-security agreements, so long as such agreements 
limited its selection of job applicants or required it to discharge 
enployees expelled from the union for what the union, but not necessarily 
the employer, regarded as good and sufficient reasons. With the outlawing 
of the closed shop, assurance of the right of selection, and assurance 
against any obligation to discharge except on the single ground of failure 
to contribute to the cost of collective bargaining, nmch o:f management's 
opposition to the union shop has disappeared.* Unions, likewise, have 
for the most part become adjusted to the present form of union shop, far 
removed from their traditional concept. 
Until recently, a union has been regarded simply as a private, 
voluntary association with the right to select its membership, to conduct 
its internal affairs, and to discharge its bargaining functions, as it 
chooses. Today there is being undertaken substantial changes in this 
attitude. For example, the Taft-Hartley Act expressly protects the right 
of a union to prescribe its own rules and regulations with respect to 
membership, wi. th one exception, namely, that to enjoy a union-shop agree-
ment, it nmst be an "open-union'', that is, one that does not discriminate 
in its admission policies.H. It is CUITently being proposed to enlarge 
*104, p 84 
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this exception so that only an open union may serve as a collective 
bargaining agent, whether or not it seeks a union-shop agreement. 
It is now being contended that to insure against discrimination, 
all emplqyees represented b.Y the union should have a voice in the formu-
lation of the union's bargaining policies, and that this cannot be assured 
unless all e~loyees have an opportunity to join the union and to parti-
cipate in its deliberations. It is also being argued that even non-members 
should have a voice in the decisions of the union, even though no element 
of discrimination be involved. Vlhatever the merits of these arguments, 
they would, if accepted without qualification have significant impact on 
the institutional status of unionism. 
A union regards itself as a medium for accomplishing the ob-
jectives of the labor movement. The trend of court decisions and pro-
posed legislation is to regard the union simply as a convenient conduct 
for the transmission of the views of the majority of e~loyees in a 
particular bargaining unit.* 
While the recently advanced concepts of "union responsibility" 
and "union democracy" tend to overlap, the latter appears to relate 
mainly to the relation of a union toward its members. By its adoption 
of its various codes, the AFL-GIO has clearly concurred in the view that 
as an institution seeld.ng to achieve industrial deomocracy, a union should 
itself observe democratic standards in its internal procedures. Its 
resistance is not to the principle, but to proposals to effectuate the 
*106, p 342 
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principle by legislation, which presupposes extensive and close administra-
tive and judicial regulation.* 
Throughout the history of American labor unions their govern-
mental development has always been founded upon the concept of majority 
rule. One of the traits of labor unions is that they are voluntary 
organizations. The union member is at liberty to discontinue his member-
ship whenever he is aggrieved. Should there be any occasion of tyrannical 
behavior by leaders, the member has an immediate and ready recourse of 
resignation. This quality of unions has been widely appealed to as 
providing the equivalent of the constitutional checks which we find in 
American Government.** 
In many situations, however, this freedom is far from complete. 
A freedom to resign may be something of a mockery if the cost of resigna-
tion is repudiation of the prospect of working in a given trade in an 
area which has been home to the individual. If there is the cost of re-
nouncing paid-for fringe benefits, the actual financial cost may be 
serious. Insofar as unions achieve their declared objectives of complete 
organization of their respective jurisdictions, this will be a very 
serious problem. 
There have been cropping up lately more and more suggestions 
for recourse to legislation and other suggestions for providing substitutes 
for internal checks by private action of an external character. Rival unionism 
has been suggested as one. Rival unionism entails situations where unions 
are not merely overlapping, but largely coincidental in their jurisdictions. 
*107, op. cit., p 605 
**lOB, p 610 
88 
It has also been suggested that pressure from employers may operate to 
check union leaderships where they act adversely to the interests of' 
membership. However, not o~ does rival unionism come under the pre-
scription of' dual unionism, but there are serious bureaucratic reasons 
for expecting little action in developing genuinely rival unions.* The 
nain opposition to rival unionism at present is that excessive collaboration 
between business and union leaders may take place at the expense of' union 
members. 
In seeking union democracy as a fundamental basis for the 
elimination of the danger of wage inflation to our country it is 
necessary that unions be tolerant of political opposition from within. 
Poll tical opposition in the form of parties is known only in the Inter-
national Typographical Union. This type of <pposition is usually called 
factionalism. The greatest advantage of a system of' factionalism within 
a union is that it provides an active guardianship of' membership interests. 
Simple reliance on reform of' constitutions may not produce constitutionalism 
in union government. In order to gain needed changes in the constitutional 
governments of unions, opposition via toleration of factions will be one 
certain means of accomplishing this end. 
In order to effectively list an adequate series of constitutional 
reforms for union governments, it might be advisable to quote a concise 
listing of some reforms suggested by Grant McConnell, an Associate 
Professor of' Political Science at the University of Chicago: 
itl09, p 614 
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"· ••• First, some unions need to remove provisions in their con-
stitutions forbidding the criticism of leadership, circulation of 
political literature during election campaigns, provisions stating 
vague catchall categories of offense, etc. Second, there need to be 
added a few simple guarantees ~t are essential to the security of 
political opposition. Some overhauling of union judicial systems 
would be of value in giving security to political opposition within 
unions. As these judicial systems now stand, they are formally founded 
on majority vote in conventions. Provisions guaranteeing honest and 
regular elections are desirable, but can hardly in themselves be relied 
upon for achievement of such elections. 
These guarantees, however, will be meaningless and the sources 
of cynicism unless they are the outcome and the accompaniment of 
a fundamental change of outlook and political theory within the labor 
movement ••••••• 
In an ideal fornW..ation, a program of reform of union governments 
would require the establishment of tully institutionalized party systems. 
SUch systems, however, cannot be declared either by simple constitutional 
revision or by legislative fiat. Party systems are always the outcome 
of long and slow development. The most that can be hoped is that with a 
series of piecemeal reforms of a constitutional character and with a 
gradual change of outlook based upon a better understanding of govern-
mental problem, parties and party s,ystems will emerge from a tolerated 
factionalism. "* 
Before weighing the prospects of amendment of the Taft-Hartley 
Act in the forseeable future, an accounting for the lack of legislative 
changes up to the pre sent time may be desirable. Undoubtedly, the 
political alignment in Congress has been the chief inhibiting factor. 
The Republican party has a stake in Taft-Hartley. The Democrats since 
the enactment of the Taft-Hartley have been hopelessly split and under 
the congressional seniority system, key committee posts have gone to 
Southern Democrats. All attempts to modify the law from the union point 
of view have been sqnelched since 1949 by Democratic disunity. 
Secon:ily, the truism that the substance of laws can be changed 
*110, op. cit., pp 604-5 
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without the necessity of legislative amendment has been reaffirmed by 
the experience under the Taft-Hartley Act. While this theme cannot be 
developed here, it can be said generally that both the NLRB and the 
courts have been modifying the interpretations and the applications of 
key provisions of the Act almost continuously since it became law.* 
Ten years of experience under the Taft-Hartley act have borne 
out the significance of one salient point concerning the Taft-Hartley 
Act: that is, it is not a "Slave-Labor Law" and it has certainly not 
destroyed trade unionism and collective bargaining. There have been 
restrictions in the law designed to inhibit union growth such as restrictions 
obstructing the use of powerful tactics and restrictions on union security 
along the same security lines as previously mentioned. 
It cannot be argued here or anywhere else that the restrictions 
in the Act and the future restrictions of legi.slati ve amendment as fair 
or unfair. Whether they are or not is something that each observer must 
decide for himself in the light of his own value judgements. In the 
ultimate analysis, the various restrictions have a bearing, direct or 
indirect, on the relative importance to be attached to such natters as 
the role of unionism and collective bargaining in the economy, the rights 
of the individual within the union, and the so-called "right to strike"·** 
All conclusions in this sphere are ult:inately value judgements so that 
many o.f these matters cannot be decided on ~ technical, analytic basis. 
We can certainly derive statistical data to corroborate the extent of 
*lll, p 337 
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our wage inflation as demonstrated in Chapter Seven. However, in pro-
posing legislative changes to inhibit the vagaries of wage inflation, it 
would seem that the economist must combine the merits of statistical 
inference with the less theoretical aspects of practical applications in 
terms deriving changes in labor law and the collective bargaining process 
in general. 
In the drafting of the Act at least four separate goals were 
explicitly stated. They were to protect the rights of individual employees, 
to protect neutrals (third persons who are wholly unconcerned in the dis -
agreement), to obtain stability in the wage bargain by effecting proper 
legal sanctions for carrying out the agreements decided by coiective 
bargaining, and to equalize existing laws in order to establish the equality 
of bargaining power necessary to maintain industrial peace.* Although 
each of the four goals is equally as important to the overall picture of 
the union-management relation, the fourth objective would seem to be the 
most significant in terms of deriving some aid for bringing about the 
termination of the wage inflation about which this thesis is concerned. 
For the reason an examination of the status of union-management equality 
may be desirable. 
The employers 1 duty to bargain as delineated in the "\'iagner Act 
was imposed in equal terms on the union in the Taft-Hartley Act. The 
distinctions that have been made concerning the balance of power between 
labor and management have often in the past been clouded over by con-
fusion between legal equality and economic equality. The "one-sidedness11 
of the Wagner Act was at least partially legislated away by certain sections 
*113, p 406 
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of the Taft-Hartley .let such as section 8 (b) (1) which was concerned 
with the unfair practices of labor that had as their effects restraint 
and coersion.* But distinctions in this matter of section 8 (b) (1) 
concerning the difference between legal equality and economic equality 
have been clouded over by the fact that the traditional union weapon 
of organizational picketing has no economic counterpart in employer 
practices. Thus, the disparity between the legal and the economi.c 
interpretations concerning union-management equality. 
Besides the goal of legal equality in the Taft-Hartley Act 
there existed the desire on the part of the 1947 Congress to equalize 
bargaining power. But, in spite of the fact of this stated objective, 
a search of the statute discloses few clauses which even point in this 
direction. It seems that the basic problem of deriving equality in 
bargaining power is that bargaining power is mostly a product of economic 
forces and not legal rules. An example of the difference in econonric 
forces that makes it difficult to legally equate the bargaining power of 
labor and management is the differing status between the textile worker 
in the North and the textile worker in the South. if* In the South he is 
too weak to bargain collectively while in the North the textile manu-
facturer can sometimes scarcely survive. ,, 
In terms of union-management bargaining equality, then, it 
would seem logical that since the objective of t he Taft-Hartley Act of 
union-management has not been achieved by the law, some equitable, r e-
stricted measure of government intervention in the bargaining process 
*114, Ibid., p 406 
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may be desirable. It is worth a try anyway. After all, this is a 
democratic country that we live in. If some measure of government inter-
vention in the bargaining process were legislatively enacted only to 
shortly demonstrate that the inequality that was to be eli.m:inated was 
only further enhanced, then, we as a democratic body would be able to 
legislate the necessary changes. Only by trial can we judge the practical 
efficacy of a particular measure or bill, provided proper safeguards are 
included to prevent undue legal and economic injustice. 
In attempting a final conclusion, the purpose of labor relations 
laws should be providing a framework wi. thin_ which free and equal col.lecti ve 
bargaining can take place. In this thesis a consideration of collective 
bargaining procedures is only undertaken for the purpose of elucidating 
on the merits of some measures to diminish, if only that, the present 
danger of inflation that our nation faces. Laws do not always accomplish 
the objectives of those who enact them. A balance may be achieved as of 
a certain time, but changing techniques and concepts may cause a shift. 
In the words of Robert Abelow, a member of the New York and Washington 
law firm of \'Tell, Gotshal and Manges: 
"•• •••• When this imbalance becomes marked, (note: namely, the 
imbalance created by inequitable laws) and when one side in the 
collective bargaining process has achieved a power that results 
in abuses and flagrant disregard for the rights of the other, 
new and corrective laws are needed. n* 
Sylvia and Benjamin Selelanan in their book, 11Power and 
Morality in a Business Society", give an apt description of the point 
at hand: 
"In actual life, however, one group or another may at times 
get the upper band. But not for long. Sooner or 1a ter a balance 
*116, p 369 
of power becomes established, for all groups realize that 
onzy with such a balance can coJI'4)romise and accomodation 
can be achieved. Indeed, if any group or special interest 
steps out of bounds and over-reaches itself, government 
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steps in with the necessar.y legislation to establish equality 
of bargaining power. Thus, it acts as an umpire to carry out 
what it had been pledged to do from the very beginning, namely, 
nainta.in a system under which all nay enjoy equality of 
opportunity. 11* 
In SWIIIIIing up, a concise statement of IItV closing ideas nay 
be more adequately iterated by Attorney Robert Abelow who in his con-
elusion to his symposium article, published in The Industrial and Labor 
'Relations Review in April of 1958 said: 
"The Taft-Hartley Act was an attempt by the govermnent to 
carry out the role as UJI'4)ire. Insofar as the Act 1s direct 
effects on management are concerned, it has been reasonably 
success.ful in some respects in restoring an equality of bargaining 
power. The experience of the past ten years has shown, however, 
that Taft-Hartley has had surprisingly little impact in Illi1I\V areas 
of great importance to employers and to the majority of the 80th 
Congress. Far from striPPing organized labor of the protection 
it needs to pursue its legitinate ends, the Act has been so inter-
preted as to permit the flourishing of certain union tactics which 
run directly counter to the spirit of the Act. All too often are 
employers placed in the impossible position of having to choose 
between subnitting to severe economic losses or riding roughshod 
over employee rights presumably guaranteed in the Act. Our labor 
law mst correct these inequities if we are to have the balance 
of power so necessary to the achievement of peace and stability 
in the volatile field of management-union relationships."** 
And so, in the same breath may we say that the ultimate purpose (at least 
in this thesis) of attaining union-management harmony is the correction 
of those danger s that threaten us with secular wage inflation in the 
years to come. 
*117, p 187 
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